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Depression is one of the most prevalent 
psychological disturbances. Virtually everyone has had 
the experience of feeling particularly sad or dejected 
in response to a personal disappointment, failure or 
loss. For most people, these feelings are not usually of 
the depth or duration to warrant the diagnosis of 
clinical depression. Nevertheless, it is estimated that 
10 percent of the population is likely to experience a 
relatively severe depressive episode at some time in the 
course of their lifespan (Brown, 1974). 
In its clinical manifestations, depression is a 
disorder which can have a highly destructive impact on 
the quality of human lives. In severe cases it may 
result in overwhelming despair, as well as withdrawal 
from interpersonal contact and productive activities. In 
such cases, suicide poses an imminent threat. 
Given the prevalence and potential seriousness 
of depression, it is crucial that psychologists develop 
a better understanding of its potential causes and 
clinical manifestations. As is the case with all 
psychopathological disorders, a variety of theoretical 




treatment of depression. In the past couple of decades, 
with the ascendance of cognitive theories in the field 
of psychology as a whole, cognitive theories have become 
particularly prominent in the study of depression. One 
of the strong points of cognitive theories is that they 
are especially well-suited to the formulation and 
examination of empirical questions. Consequently, in 
recent years, there has also been a tremendous increase 
in the amount of research devoted to the study of 
clinical depression. 
One particular paradigm, the reformulated 
learned helplessness model of depression (Abramson, 
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978), has fueled much of the 
recent interest in the cognitive correlates of 
depression. The basic thrust of this model is that 
individuals who characteristically possess a particular 
constellation of thought patterns are at risk for 
becoming depressed in response to negative life events. 
These thought patterns concern the causes that 
individuals attribute to negative experiences. 
Specifically, the model asserts that depressed 
individuals have a tendency to invoke internal (self-
blaming), stable (persistent over time) and global 
(generalizable to many situations) explanations for the 
causes of negative events. (\ While 
..------,-- . -l 
this theory has 
generated a plethora of research, it has not gone 
3 
uncriticized (e.g., Depue & Monroe, 1978; Wortman & 
ointzer, 1978), nor has it garnered consistent 
empirical support (e.g., Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Peterson, 
Villanova, & Raps, 1985). 
The general aim of the present investigation is 
to contribute to the existing theoretical and empirical 
work on the reformulated learned helplessness model of 
depression. Specifically, this research addresses four 
problems which have been largely overlooked in the 
previous research, and which have important 
ramifications in terms of understanding the strengths, 
limitations, and applications of the model. 
One potential problem with the reformulated 
learned helplessness model {Hammen & Cochran, 1981) 
concerns the fact that the model is limited to 
attributions regarding the causes of negative events. 
Hammen suggests that the model be expanded to include 
attributions regarding the consequences of negative 
events, as well, since these cognitions may have an 
important bearing on the extent to which individuals 
believe that they will be able to cope with their 
negative experiences. Therefore, the present study 
examines cognitions related to both the causes, as well 
as the consequences of events, and their relation to 
depression. 
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A second problem in much of the research on the 
reformulated learned helplessness model is that it has 
relied on a measure of hypothetical events, the 
Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Seligman, 
Abramson, Semmel, &, von Baeyer, 1979) to assess 
attributions. Hammen and her colleagues have urged that 
depression researchers begin to examine attributions for 
personally meaningful experiences. ~i~ argued that if 
the spontaneous thought processes of depressed 
individuals are, in fact, qualitatively different from 
'") 
those of nondepressed individuals,fthen the best way to 
~-,~~~..i 
assess these thought processes is through the use of an 
ecologically valid, personally meaningful instrument. 
Accordingly, the present study examines attributions for 
real-life events, as well as attributions for 
hypothetical events. 
A third problem is that the model has most often 
been investigated in the context of achievement-oriented 
scenarios. As Hammen and Cochran ( 1981) note, this 
limitation is particularly significant in that 
attributions for the kinds of losses, major 
disagreements, and separations frequently associated 
with clinical depression have been virtually ignored in 
the empirical literature. Therefore, the present study 
makes an explicit distinction between achievement-
oriented versus interpersonally-oriented events in 
5 
examining the link between cognitive responses to life 
events and depression. 
Finally, a fourth problem is that the role of 
attributions for positive events is not well defined in 
the reformulated learned helplessness model, despite the 
fact that the instrument most frequently used to test 
the model, the ASQ, contains both positive and negative 
events. Although a number of studies have examined the 
relation between attributions for hypothetical positive 
events and depression (e.g. , Blaney, Behar, & Head, 
1980; Raps, Peterson, Reinhard, & Abramson, 1982; 
Seligman, Abramson, et al., 1979), relatively few 
studies have examined the relation between attributions 
for real-life positive events and depression (e.g., 
Zautra, Guenther, & Chartier, 1985). Therefore, the 
present study examines the relation between attributions 
and depression using measures of positive and negative 
hypothetical and real-life events. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES OF THE 
PRESENT STUDY 
The Role of Cognitions in Depression: Theoretical 
Background 
Many of the contemporary theoretical and 
empirical approaches to depression hinge on the 
proposition that certain cognitive patterns play an 
integral role in the etiology, symptomatology, and time 
course of clinical. depression. Historically, these 
cognitive patterns have centered around two disparate 
themes: (1) self-blame, self-deprecation, and guilt, and 
( 2) helplessness, hopelessness, and personal futility 
(Abramson & Sackheim, 1977). 
As early as the 2nd century A.D., Plutarch 
characterized depressives as individuals who desire 
self-punishment. In the 20th century, Freud (1917) 
accented themes of self-blame and self-punishment in his 
description of persons suffering from "melancholia". 
Freud wrote, 
The distinguishing mental features of 
melancholia are a profoundly painful dejection, 
cessation of interest in the outside world, loss 
of capacity to love,inhibition of all activity, 
and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to 
a degree that finds utterance in self-reproaches 
and self-revilings, and culminates in a 
delusional expectation of punishment (p.244). 
6 
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In his landmark book, .=D""'e~p""r'-'e::..:s,..s=i=o~n:...:: __ ...;:::c;..:l:...::i=n=l.::.;. c=a=l_,_, 
experimental and theoretical aspects, Beck (1967) 
delineated a model of depression in which cognitions 
related to self-blame and self-criticism play a focal 
role in the onset and maintenance of depressive 
symptoms. 
identified three self-defeating aspects of the 
depressive's orientation to reality, which he referred 
to as the "primary triad in depression." 
The ~first compon.ent. of the triad is the 
.::o.-....1 
depressive's tendency to view him- or herself in 
negative terms. Writes Beck (1967), the depressed 
person "regards himself as deficient, 
I. 'r 
' .. ~ ... 




experiences to a physical, mental, or moral defect in 
himself. l Furthermore he regards himself as undesirable 
and worthless because of· his presumed defect, and tends 
to reject himself because of it." (p.255). 
... , ..... ' 
The /Second 
I . .. 
component of the triad is the depressive's tendency to 
construe experiences in a negative manner. The 
depressed individual habitually views his or her 
interactions with the world as leading to defeat or 
! 
deprivation. The ;thfrd--comp-onent' is a pessimistic view 
of the future; the -depressed individual envisions a 
future which entails continued defeat and deprivation. 
According to Beck (1967, 1976), these faulty cognitions 
8 
result in the affective, motivational, and somatic 
symptoms associated with depression. 
Beck (1967) asserts further that these three 
negative idiosyncratic attitudes represent consistent 
cognitive patterns or schemas. Schemas are enduring 
mental representations of early developmental 
experiences that determine the manner in which incoming 
environmental stimuli are attended to, encoded, and 
interpreted. Thus, faulty schemas are mechanisms which 
cause individuals to distort their experiences in 
negative terms, thereby causing dysphoric feelings such 
as sadness, guilt, loneliness, and pessimism. These 
"depressogenic" schemas prevent the matching of more 
···---------------~---· ···~ ···-··· 
appropriate and benign schemas to objectively positive 
or neutral situations. As depressogenic schemas become 
more active, they can be evoked by an increasingly wide 
range of environmental inputs. Beck speculated that 
changes in one's social environment or other stressful 
life events might provide the kinds of environmental 
inputs that would lead to the activation of a 
depressogenic schema. 
Although not entirely incompatible with the 
theme of self-blame as a central tendency of 
depressives, the theme of helplessness is conceptually 
distinct and has lead to a divergent branch of theory 
and research. Aretaeus (cited in Abramson & Sackheim, 
9 
1977; Beck; 1967), in the 2nd century A.D., 
characterized depressives as individuals who suffer from 
a sense of helplessness, powerlessness, and personal 
futility. 
More recently, Bibring (1953) cast the notion of 
helplessness in psychoanalytic terms. Like many other 
psychoanalytic thinkers, Bibring (1953) believed that 
depress; ion results from early childhood traumas, and 
that it is characterized by a loss of self-esteem. 
However, Bibring departed from the traditional 
psychoanalytic tenets by proposing that in depressives, 
these early traumas result in a conflict within the···ego- .... 
itself, rather than between the ego and the superego. 
According to Bibring (1953), this intra-ego conflict in 
depressive gives rise to profound feelings of 
helplessness in the ego. These feelings might manifest 
themselves in a variety of contexts. In particular, 
Bibring asserted that depressed individuals would be 
likely to envision themselves as being "helplessly 
exposed to superior powers, fatal organic disease, or 
recurrent neurosis, or to the seemingly inescapable fate 
of being lonely, isolated, or unloved, or unavoidably 
confronted with the apparent evidence of being weak, 
inferior, or a failure" (1953, p.23). 
Emerging from this general tradition, the 
preeminent theory to integrate themes of helplessness 
10 
into a cohere11t pe>:rtrayal of depression is the learned 
helplessness model of depression advanced by Seligman 
(1975). The original inspiration for this model came 
from laboratory studies (Seligman & Maier, 1967; 
overmier & Seligman, 1967) in which it was found that 
dogs that had been given inescapable shock developed 
impairments in their escape-avoidance behavior: they 
failed to escape or avoid shock in a subsequent phase of 
the experiment in which the shock could have been 
avoided by performing a simple response. These 
impairments were interpreted as a consequence of the 
dogs' learning in the initial treatment phase 
(uncontrollable shock) that reinforcement (cessation of 
shock) was independent of voluntary behaviors. This 
effect has been replicated with a variety of animals, 
from fish to rats and cats (see Maier & Seligman, 1976 
for a review of the infrahuman literature). 
Seligman (1975) proposed that depressed humans 
suffer from an analogous form of learned helplessness. 
Depressed individuals, argues Seligman, are people who 
-·" 
have ~eveloped an expectation that they have no control 
over the outcomes of events. This expectation results in 
the cognitive, affective, motivational, and self-esteem 
deficits associated with depression. In one of the 
earliest attempts to extend the learned helplessness 
phenomenon to humans, Hirota (1974) conducted a study in 
11 
which he exposed college students to uncontrollable 
noise and then subjected them to an aversive noise which 
could be turned off by moving a lever. In support of 
the learned helplessness hypothesis, 
had been exposed to uncontrollable 
the subjects who 
noise failed to 
initiate a simple response in order to avoid subsequent 
aversive, but controllable noise. Similarly, a number 
of other laboratory studies (e.g., Hiroto & Seligman, 
1975; Klein, Fencil-Morse, & Seligman, 1976) have 
examined the relationship between uncontrollable events 
and subsequent "helpless" behaviors in humans (see 
Miller and Norman, 1979 for a review). 
Some of the early empirical work on learned 
helplessness demonstrated that the model had three major 
inadequacies in its application to humans (Abramson, 
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). First, the model made no 
distinction between situations in which outcomes would 
be uncontrollable for 
helplessness) versus those 
uncontrollable only for 
all people (universal 
in which they would be 
some people (personal 
helplessness). Second, it did not differentiate between 
situations in which helplessness deficits would have 
general versus specific implications. Third, it did not 
make a distinction between chronic versus acute 
helplessness. In an attempt to remedy these 
inadequacies, Abramson, et al. (1978) restated the 
12 
learned helplessness model along attributional lines. 
Additionally, they suggested that events which are 
perceived as negative and uncontrollable are associated 
with the affective component of depression, whereas 
events which are perceived as positive and 
uncontrollable are hot. 
According to the reformulated learned 
helplessness model, there are three attributional 
dimensions which characterize the cognitive patterns of 
depressed indiViduals relative to nondepressed 
individuals. The first is the internal-external 
dimension, which refers to whether the individual 
regards a negative event as being self-caused (internal) 
-----------· 
or caused by the situation or other people (external) • 
Th_g._~ is the global-specific dimension, which 
refers to whether the individual views negative events 
as having generalized implications (global) or as having 
limited implications (specific). ~sthe 
stable-unstable dimension, which refers to whether the 
individual views negative events as being long-lived or 
recurrent (stable) versus short-lived or intermittent 
(unstable) • The central tenet of the model is that 
depressed individuals have a tendency to evoke internal, 
global, and stable attributions for the causes of 
negative events. Thus, for example, when depressed 
students fail a math test they might tell themselves 
13 
that the failure was their own fault (internal), that 
they are generally stupid and likely to fail in many 
subjects (global), and that this kind of failure occurs 
in their lives quite, regularly (stable). It is 
postulated that a depressive attributional style is a 
risk factor which predisposes an individual to become 
depressed in response to negative experiences. 




Another facet of the attributional reformulation 
of the learned helplessness model is that it provides a 
preliminary empirical framework for exploring the ways 
in which the disparate themes of helplessness and self-
blame may be integrated. Abramson and Sackheim (1977) 
have convincingly illustrated the conceptual paradox 
that arises from attempts to view Beck's model and the 
original learned helplessness model as complementary; 
in essence, a synthesis of the two theories would 
suggest that depressives blame themselves for bad events 
which they did not cause and cannot control. According 
to Abramson, et al. (1978), although the reformulation 
does not address explicitly the relation between blame 
and helplessness, it eliminates any theoretical 
contradictions. In terms of the revised theory, 
individuals who believe they are personally helpless 
make internal (self-blaming) attributions for failure, 
14 
whereas individuals who believe they are universally 
helpless make external attributions for failure. 
Expanding on the relation between internality 
and blame, Janoff-Bulman (1979) argued that 
characterological self-blame (i.e., it happened to me 
because of the kind of person I am) produces 
helplessness and depression, whereas behavioral self-
blame (i.e. , it happened to me because of my actions) 
does not. In an attempt to examine Janoff~Bulman's 
theory empirically, Peterson, Schwartz, and Seligman 
(1981) conducted a study in which they asked college 
students to make causal attributions for a nu$er of 
hypothetical events involving themselves, and then had 
raters code the attributions as external, behavioral, or 
characterological. In support of Janoff-Bulman's 
theory, they found that internal attributions for bad 
events were associated with depression only when the 
attributions were characterological, rather than 
behavioral. Externally attributed bad events were 
negatively related to depression. 
In a further refinement of the role of 
cognitions in depression, Hammen and Cochran (1981) have 
proposed that cognitive models of depression should be 
expanded to include nonattributional cognitions about 
the consequences of negative experiences. This idea is 
derived from the theoretical formulations of Bandura 
(1977) 
15 
on self-efficacy, as well as Wortman and 
ointzer' s ( 197 8) critique of the reformulated learned 
helplessness model, both of which highlight the 
importance of a person's beliefs regarding his or her 
ability to cope with negative outcomes. In light of 
these viewpoints, Hammen and Cochran (1981) suggest that 
the manner in which an individual regards the 
implications of negative events may have a significant 
impact on the development of depression. Thus, they 
predict that cognitions about causes, and cognitions 
about consequences, will be significantly associated 
with depression. The "nonattributional" cognitions 
about consequences include: prior expectation of a 
negative event's occurrence, perceived likelihood of the 
recurrence of negative events, a high degree of 
uncertainty in other areas of one's life in response to 
negative events, and a high degree of upset in response 
to negative events. 
Moreover, in terms of causal attributions, 
Hammen and Cochran (1981) add two dimensions to their 
model: controllability and intentionality. Both of 
these dimensions are believed to play a role in the 
tendency of depressed individuals to blame themselves 
and to criticize themselves. Although proponents of the 
learned helplessness model recognize the importance of 
attributional dimensions beyond the three dimensions 
16 
emphasized in their model (Abramson, et al., 1980), they 
do not explicitly incorporate additional variables into 
the model. 
One of the primary goals of the present study 
was to examine the cognitions of depressed and 
nondepressed individuals in light of the two different 
models. Thus, in keeping with the predictions of the 
learned helplessness model, the first hypothesis of the 
study is that depressed individuals, relative to 
nondepressed individuals, show a stronger tendency to 
make internal, global, and stable attributions for 
negative events. Following the predictions of the 
expanded model employed by Hammen and her colleagues 
(e.g., Hammen & Cochran, 1981), the second hypothesis of 
the present study is that depressed individuals, 
relative to nondepressed individuals are not only more 
internal, global and stable in their attributions for 
negative events, but also characterize these events as 
more intended, uncontrollable, expected, likely to 
recur, and as creating a greater degree of upset and 
uncertainty in their lives. 
The Assessment of Cognitions in Depression 
Hypothetical Versus Real-life Events 
Much of the research conducted on the learned 
helplessness paradigm has relied on a self-report 
17 
measure, the Attributional style Questionnaire (ASQ; 
peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, Abramson, Metalsky, & 
seligman, 1982} to assess depressive attributions. The 
ASQ consists of 12 hypothetical positive and negative 
scenarios. Within the positive and negative categories, 
the scenarios are equally divided between achievement-
oriented and interpersonally-oriented situations. 
In completing the ASQ, subjects are instructed 
to imagine that they are experiencing the events 
described and to rate each event on seven-point scales 
corresponding to the three attributional dimensions. In 
addition, they are asked to rate how important they 
would consider the event if it were to happen to them. 
The importance rating was included in light of the 
suggestion by Miller and Norman (1979, cited in 
Abramson, Garber, & Seligman, 1980) that the magnitude 
of depressive deficits may depend on the relative 
importance an individual assigns to an event. 
One major critic ism of the ASQ, concerns the 
extent to which the thought patterns that individuals 
manifest in response to hypothetical events are an 
accurate reflection of the kinds of thought patterns 
they might exhibit in 




(e.g., Barthe & 
Hammen, 1981; Gong-Guy & Hammen, 1980; Hammen & Cochran, 
1981) have argued cogently that it is crucial ·that 
18 
depression researchers examine cognitions in response to 
personally meaningful real-life events, as opposed to 
hypothetical events. Much of the existing research is 
limited in that the attributions that individuals make 
in response to the kinds of personal losses, 
disruptions, and upsets frequently associated with 
clinical depression have been virtually overlooked. 
Within the past few years a number of 
researchers have begun to examine the relation between 
cognitions, significant life events, and depression. It 
is very important to note, however, that the majority of 
the studies which have examined the attributional 
patterns of individuals who are experiencing some type 
of personal life stress have done so by assessing 
attributions for hypothetical events, and not for the 
actual life events being experienced (e.g., Manly, 
McMahon, Bradley, & Davidson, 1982; O'Hara, Rehm, & 
Campbell, 1982; Persons & Rao, 1985). Recently, 
however, there have been a few researchers who have 
assessed attributions for the actual stressful events 
themselves. 
One approach has been to examine the 
attributions that individuals make for both hypothetical 
and real-life events. Miller, Klee, and Norman ( 1982) 
examined the attributions of depressed and nondepressed 
inpatients for three types of situations: their single 
19 
most stressful life event, six hypothetical events 
selected from the Attributional Style Questionnaire, and 
an experimental task involving noise-escape. They 
found that depressed patients exhibited a depressive 
attributional style in describing their most stressful 
life event. Depressed and nondepressed patients did not 
differ, however, in their attributional ratings of 
hypothetical events or experimental tasks. Only 
composite scores which average the internal, global, and 
stable dimensions of the learned helplessness model were 
reported. Therefore, one criticism of this study is 
that it does not provide any information about the 
individual attributional dimensions. A second criticism 
of this study (Peterson & Seligman, 1984) is that it 
assessed attributions for only one event, which may not 
provide a reliable estimate of an individual's 
attributional style. 
In another study which examined attributions for 
real-life as well as hypothetical events (Zautra, 
Guenther, & Chartier, 1985), college students were asked 
to make attributional ratings of their most pleasant and 
most unpleasant daily events for 14 days, and were also 
administered the ASQ twice, two weeks apart. Level of 
depression was assessed using the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 
1961) and the Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Derogatis, 
20 
1977) . They found that attribution scores from the 
daily logs were correlated significantly with ASQ 
scores. They also found that the attributional ratings 
of real-life negative outcomes were related to higher 
depression scores only when the attributions were both 
stable and internal. Therefore, unstable and internal 
attributions were not related to depression scores, 
which is inconsistent with the learned helplessness 
theory. 
One methodological weakness of the zautra et al. 
(1985) study was that the authors did not pre-screen 
subjects in order to select both depressed and 
nondepressed students. As a result, they based their 
conclusions regarding the relation between hypothetical 
versus real-life events and depression on a 
predominately nondepressed sample. 
In a third study, Cutrona ( 19 8 3) examined the 
attributions of pregnant women whom she followed up from 
the third trimester of their pregnancies through the 
second month after childbirth. Because the learned 
helplessness model is a diathesis-stress model, 
administering attributional measures to individuals who 
have a high probability of encountering some type of 
stressful experience during the course of an actual 
study is perhaps the best way to test the model. Since 
pregnancy is a period of tremendous biological changes, 
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as well as changes in role expectations, significant 
relationships, and so forth, childbearing women are 
likely to experience a significant degree of stress 
during and immediately following their pregnancies. At 
least partially as a result of these stressors, many 
women experience what has become known as "postpartum 
depression". Thus, the study of the attributions of 
pregnant women is well-suited to the task of examining 
the link between cognitions, stressful life events, and 
depression. 
Cutrona assessed the women's depressive 
attributions via the ASQ during the third trimester. She 
also assessed depressive attributions for their three 
most stressful childcare-related events via interviews 
conducted at two weeks after delivery, and at eight 
weeks after delivery. She found that ASQ-based 
assessments of attributional style were significant 
predictors of subsequent postpartum depression. However, 
the ASQ-assessed attributional style was not predictive 
of the causal attributions that individuals gave for 
their actual stressful life events. Additionally, she 
found that attributional ratings for recent real-life 
stressors were not significantly related to depression. 
Thus, attributions for hypothetical events provided some 
degree of evidence for the phenomenon of a depressive 
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attributional style, while attributions for real-life 
events did not. 
It is difficult to draw conclusions regarding 
the merits of hypothetical versus real-life 
attributional measures on the basis of these three 
studies in view of their markedly different samples, 
methodological problems, and inconsistent findings. The 
Cutrona study, which provided the weakest evidence for a 
link between attributions for real-life events and 
depression, is the most methodologically sophisticated 
of the three studies, but it remains to be seen whether 
the findings of the study are generalizable to other 
populations of depressives. 
There have also been a few cross-sectional 
studies which have examined only the attributions that 
individuals make in response to retrospective accounts 
of their own personal experiences. In one study, Gong-
Guy and Hammen (1980) assessed the cognitions of 
depressed and nondepressed outpatients for the five most 
stressful events that had occurred within a six month 
period prior to the study. They assessed attributions 
via a questionnaire which reflects all of the variables 
in their expanded model (attributions of consequences, 
as well as causes). In addition, they performed a 
content analysis of audiotaped intake interviews in 
order to assess spontaneous attributions. Wheri the 
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results were collapsed across all of the five stressful 
events for each individual, no differences in cognitions 
were found between depressed and nondepressed groups. 
In an analysis of the single event rated as the most 
stressful, however, they found that depressed 
individuals rated this event as significantly more 
intended, global, expected, and stable than did the 
nondepressed individuals. Moreover, they found that the 
questionnaire assessment of attributions had acceptable 
concurrent validity with the attributions which were 
gleaned from the spontaneous intake interviews. 
In a related study, Hammen and Cochran (1981) 
assessed attributions about the causes and consequences 
of five recent stressful events in samples of depressed, 
nondepressed, and nondepressed and highly stressed, 
college students. Contrary to the predictions of the 
reformulated learned helplessness model, the groups did 
not differ in their causal attributions. The groups did 
differ, however, in the cognitions about the 
consequences of stressful events. Specifically, 
depressed students indicated that they experienced more 
upset and more uncertainty in response to negative 
events than did either of the nondepressed groups. 
In a third study, Barthe and Hammen (1981) 
examined the attributions of depressed and nondepressed 
college students in response to an actual course 
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examination. In this study there were two findings 
which were consistent with the predictions of the 
reformulated learned helplessness model. First, they 
found that the depressed students perceived less control 
over their performance than did the nondepressed 
students. Second, the depressed students blamed 
themselves for their failures, but did not credit 
themselves for achievements. Contrary to the 
predictions of the reformulated model, however, there 
was no evidence of an association between internal or 
stable attributions and depression. 
In a fourth study, Hammen and deMayo (1982) 
assessed the attributions of teachers in an urban high 
school. This environment afforded the investigators an 
opportunity to study individuals sharing a common 
stressor, thereby eliminating some of the uncontrolled 
variation of the previous studies which have examined 
cognitions in response to idiographic stressors. They 
found that depression was significantly associated with 
attributions regarding the consequences of the stressful 
teaching situation, but not those regarding the causes 
of the situation. 
In a similar vein, Harvey (1981), studied 
attributions for positive and negative real-life events 
in a sample of depressed and nondepressed female college 
students. In support of the predictions of the 
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reformulated learned helplessness model, he found that 
depressed students viewed the causes of their negative 
experiences as more internal relative to the 
nondepressed students. Contrary to the predictions of 
this model, however, he found that the depressed 
individuals viewed these experiences as more 
controllable than did the nondepressed students. 
Finally, he found no support for the proposition that 
depressed individuals are more stable and global in 
their explanations of negative events. 
There has also been one longitudinal study that 
investigated depressive attributions for real-life 
events. Pagel, Becker, and Coppel (1985) examined loss 
of control, self-blame and depression among the spouse 
caregivers of Alzheimer's Disease patients. Using a 
questionnaire modeled after the ASQ, they assessed 
cognitions related to the caregivers' perceived control 
and internal-external causal attributions. They found 
that perceived loss of control combined with a tendency 
to make internal attributions predicted higher 
depression than did either one alone. They also found, 
however, that internal attributions were associated with 
hostility as well as depression. This argues against 
the reformulated learned helplessness model contention 
that depression is the specific emotional reaction 
associated with self-blaming attributions. Global and 
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stable attributions were not investigated in this 
particular study. 
As noted by Coyne and Gotlib ( 1983) , and by 
Peterson, Villanova and Raps (1985), the existing 
research on the relation between real-life events, 
cognitions, and depression provide weak and inconsistent 
support for the contentions of the learned helplessness 
model. The studies conducted by Hammen and her 
colleagues provide some preliminary support for the 
proposition that the explanatory power of the model 
would be increased if it were expanded to include a 
broader range of cognitions, particularly in its 
application to personally meaningful events. 
In light of the controversy surrounding the role 
of attributions for real-life events, a second major 
goal of the present study was to examine the relation 
between attributions for hypothetical versus real-life 
events and depression. Considering the differences in 
populations, procedures, and sampling techniques in the 
aforementioned studies, it would be difficult, if not 
impossible to devise a study which addressed all of the 
possible sources of error in the previous work. Instead 
this study attempted to bring together some of the more 
compelling aspects of the previous studies, while 
avoiding many of the conceptual and methodical problems 
inherent in some of these studies. 
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The present study examined both hypothetical and 
real life events in a large sample of depressed and 
nondepressed college students. Students were 
prescreened to assess their level of depression in order 
to insure that there would be a substantial number of 
depressed individuals in our sample. Attributions for 
both hypothetical and real-life events were assessed 
across a large number of events (six positive and six 
negative) to get an indication of differences in 
attributional style. Finally, the study examined all of 
the theoretically important attributional dimensions 
(concerning both causes and consequences) in order to 
identify the specific types of cognitions that are 
associated with depression. 
Contrary to the contentions of Coyne and Gotlib 
(1983), but consistent with those of Hammen and Cochran 
it is predicted that is more evidence of a depressive 
cognitive style for real-life, as opposed to 
hypothetical events. 
Achievement-oriented versus Interpersonally-oriented 
Events 
There is a tradition in psychology for positing 
two conceptually distinct, primary goals in mature human 
existence: to love and to work. Popular lore has it that 
Freud was the originator of this notion, but it is 
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likely that this basic dichotomy has even earlier roots. 
In any case, the conceptual importance of this 
distinction is evident in contemporary descriptions of 
virtually every form of psychopathology ( a quick 
perusal of the DSM-III will attest to this). 
consequently, any theory which purports to explain a 
deficit or disorder in psychological functioning should 
address the issue of the ways in which the disorder 
affects both interpersonal, as well as work functioning. 
one of the major limitations of the current research on 
the reformulated learned helplessness model is that most 
of it has examined attributions only in achievement-
oriented contexts (e.g., Barthe & Hammen, 1981; Kuiper, 
1978; Metalsky, Abramson, Seligman, Semmel, & Peterson, 
1982) • 
This is especially problematic in light of some 
recent theories of depression which suggest that there 
may be important individual differences in the ways in 
which people respond to interpersonally-oriented as 




Blatt, Quinlan, Chevron, McDonald, & 
For example, Hammen, Marks, deMayo, and 
propose that there are "dependent" 
depressives who are especially sensitive to negative 
.interpersonally-oriented events, as well as "self-
critical" depressives who are more vulnerable to 
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difficulties in the context of negative achievement-
oriented events. 
An additional problem with much of the 
existing research concerns the use of the ASQ. The ASQ 
is, in theory, divided into achievement-oriented and 
interpersonally-oriented situations: for all practical 
purposes, however, the distinction between the two 
themes is rather vague. For example, one item from the 
questionnaire reads, "you do a project which is highly 
praised". This item is classified as a positive 
"interpersonal " event, although it clearly has an 
achievement-oriented dimension as well. 
In light of these difficulties, the current 
investigation employed a new measure of attributions for 
personally meaningful events, the Personal Experiences 
Attribution Questionnaire (PEAQ; McAdams & Lensky, 1985) 
which makes an explicit distinction between 
interpersonally-oriented and achievement-oriented 
events. This questionnaire is described fully in the 
section on Methods, and is included in Appendix A. 
In addition, this study explored whether or not 
there are differences in attributional style for events 
in interpersonal, as opposed to achievement domains. It 
might be that part of the reason that there have not 
been very robust findings in previous attributional 
research is that most studies have ignored the type of 
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situation for which the attributions were made. If 
there is stronger evidence for a depressive 
attributional style for one particular type of event, 
then collapsing results across the two types of events 
might result in an overall attenuated finding. 
An ancillary goal of the study was to examine 
individual differences in depression by integrating two 
heretofore independent lines of research: studies of 
the cognitive correlates of depression, and studies of 
motive patterns. A motive (McClelland, 1985) is a 
recurrent concern or preference for a goal state which 
energizes, directs, and selects behavior. Three of the 
most well-defined motivational constructs are those of 
achievement, power, and intimacy. According to 
McClelland {1985), these motives can be defined as 
follows: achievement motivation is a recurrent concern 
about the goal state of performing better on a task; 
power motivation is a recurrent preference for the goal 
state of exerting an influence over other people or 
situations; and intimacy motivation is a recurrent 
preference for the goal state of engaging in warm, close 
interpersonal relationships. Typically, motives are 
assessed via the Thematic Apperception Test {TAT; 
Murray, 1943). Discrete, highly reliable scoring 
systems have been developed for each of these three 
motives. There have been a large number of studies, 
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particularly with regard to the motives of achievement 
and power, which attest to the construct validity of 
these scoring systems. For reviews, see McClelland 
(1985) for achievement, Winter and stewart (1978) for 
power, and McAdams (1982) for intimacy. 
This study attempted an exploratory analysis of 
the role of motive patterns as possible mediators of 
depression. First, it examined the relation between 
intimacy motivation and depression. Given that there 
is some evidence in previous research (McAdams & Bryant, 
in press; McAdams & Vaillant, 1982) which suggests that 
intimacy motivation is associated with enhanced 
adaptation in terms of happiness and success in adult 
life, it is expected that there is an inverse relation 
between intimacy motivation and depression. That is, it 
is predicted that individuals who are high in intimacy 
motivation are less depressed than individuals who are 
low in intimacy motivation. 
Secondly, this study examined the interaction 
between motives (intimacy and achievement), and negative 
life events (interpersonally-oriented and achievement-
oriented) on the one hand, and their association with 
depressive attributional style on the other. It is 
predicted that depressed individuals who are high in 
intimacy motivation show a more pronounced depressive 






it is predicted that 
high in achievement 
motivation show a more pronounced depressive 
attributional style for negative events in the 
achievement realm. To elucidate this point, it seems 
reasonable to predict that if a depressed individual 
manifests a recurrent preference for warm, close 
interpersonal experiences, then this individual would be 
more likely to show a depressive cognitive style for 
negative interpersonally-oriented, as opposed to 
achievement-oriented experiences. If, on the other 
hand, a depressed individual manifests a recurrent 
preference for doing better on instrumental tasks, then 
this individual would be more likely to show a 
depressive cognitive style for negative achievement-
oriented, as opposed to interpersonally-oriented 
experiences. 
Positive Versus Negative Events 
Although the cornerstone of the reformulated 
learned helplessness model is that depressives tend to 
invoke internal, global, and stable attributions for the 
causes of negative events, it is interesting to 
speculate about attributional patterns for positive 
events. Abramson et al. (1978) propose the converse 
prediction for the relation between depressive 
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attributions and positive events. That is, they predict 
that depressives tend to invoke external. specific, and 
unstable attributions for the causes of positive events. 
As zautra et al. (1985) note, however, the role of 
positive events is not well-defined in the learned 
helplessness model. Nonetheless, a number of ,~ ' '-t .. ' 
i /" 
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researchers have examined the relation between causa~ ,,$; 
attributions for positive events, and depression. 
Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, and von 
(1979) examined the attributions of depressed 
nondepressed college students using the ASQ in terms of 
both positive and negative events. For the attributions 
of negative events, they found that the depressed 
students were significantly more internal, stable, and 
global than the nondepressed students. For the 
attributions of positive events, they found that 
depressed students were more external, and unstable, but 
not more specific than nondepressed students. 
Additionally, the findings for the positive events were 
markedly less robust than those for the negative events. 
In a similar study of college undergraduates, 
Blaney, Behar, and Head (1980) also found evidence that 
depressed individuals are more internal, global, and 
stable than nondepressed students in their evaluations 
of negative events as assessed by the ASQ. These 
findings were, however, weaker than those reported in 
). 





the Seligman et al. (1979) study. In further 
concordance with the Seligman et al. (1979) study, they 
found that the depressed students were more external and 
unstable in their attributions for positive events, but 
not more specific. 
In a study of depressed unipolar male patients, 
Raps, Peterson, Reinhard, and Abramson (1982) found 
evidence for an internal, stable and global depressive 
attributional style for negative events using th~ ASQ. 
In addition, consistent with the findings of Seligman et 
al. (1979) and Blaney et al. (1980), they found that 
depressives 
attributions 
were more external and unstable in their 
for positive events. Additionally, the 
findings for positive events were less robust than those 
for the negative events. In the aforementioned study by 
Harvey (1981), depressed and nondepressed college 
students did not differ in their ratings of causes for 
positive events. 
Munic (1982), examined the attributions of 
depressed psychiatric patients using the ASQ, and found 
support for a depressive attributional style in response 
to negative events. In terms of positive events, 
however, there were significant correlations with 
depression only for external attributions and for the 
composite scores (averaged across the three types of 
attributions) of the attributional dimensions. 
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Although examinations of attributions for 
positive events have generally yielded weak support for 
a depressive attributional style, in the present study 
it is predicted that depressives show an attributional 
pattern for positive events that is the opposite of the 
pattern shown for negative events. Thus, in terms of 
the learned helplessness model, it is hypothesized that 
depressives make external. unstable. and specific 
attributions for the causes of positive events. In 
terms of Hammen and her colleagues' expanded model, it 
is also hypothesized that depressives view the causes of 
positive events as being more unintentional and less 
controllable, and that they view the consequences of 
these events as being less pleasant, less likely to 
recur, more unexpected. and as creating more uncertainty 
in their lives. 
Summary of the Hypotheses of the Present study: 
1. That depressed individuals, relative to nondepressed 
individuals, show a greater tendency to make internal, 
global, and stable attributions for negative events. 
2. That depressed individuals also characterize these 
negative events .as being more intended, uncontrollable, 
expected, likely to recur, and as creating a greater 
degree of upset and uncertainty in their lives. 
3. That there is more evidence 







4. That there is an inverse relation between intimacy 
motivation and depression. 
s. That depressed individuals who are high in intimacy 
motivation show a more pronounced depressive 
attributional style for negative events in the 
interpersonal realm. 
6. That depressed individuals who are high in 
achievement motivation show a more pronounced depressive 
attributional style for negative events in the 
achievement realm. 
7. That depressed individuals make external, unstable, 
and specific attributions for the causes of positive 
events. 
8. That depressed individuals view the causes of 
positive events as more unintended and less 
controllable, and view the consequences of these events 
as being less pleasant, less likely to recur, more 





Subjects for the present study were 
undergraduates in introductory psychology classes at 
Loyola University of Chicago. The study was conducted 
over the course of three semesters, between November, 
1984 and December, 1985. Data collection and subject 
involvement occurred in two separate phases. In both 
phases, students were informed that their participation 
in the study was completely voluntary. In addition, 
students were instructed to use code numbers instead of 
names on all of the measures in order to insure their 
anonymity and confidentiality. 
In the first phase, approximately 450 students 
were screened for depression using the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI; Beck, et al., 1961), a brief 
questionnaire that is suitable for group administration. 
This screening was conducted in several large lecture 
classes, typically in the last 10 minutes of a class 
meeting. Each group of students was told that some 
students would be contacted by phone and asked to 
participate in the second part of the study. 
Students were tentatively classified as depressed or 
nondepressed based on the cutoff recommended by Beck et 
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al. (1961). Students scoring 10 or above were 
classified as depressed, and students scoring below 5 
were classified as nondepressed. The aim of this 
procedure was to attain samples of approximately 7 5 
depressed and 7 5 nondepressed students, with roughly 
equal numbers of males and females in each group. 
In the second phase, both depressed and 
nondepressed students were contacted by phone and asked 
if they would like to participate in the second part of 
the project. The project was described as " a study of 
the life events of college students." Potential 
subjects were told that this part of the study would be 
conducted in small group sessions, that it would involve 
writing about their personal experiences, and that it 
would require approximately three hours of their time. 
Subjects were also informed that they would receive 
course credit for their participation. 
Approximately 200 students were called and asked 
to participate in the second phase of the study. 
Approximately 25 students did not agree to participate, 
either because of scheduling difficulties, or because 
they had already received all of the course credits that 
they needed to fulfill the introductory psychology 
requirement. An additional 15 students initially agreed 
to participate, but then failed to attend their 
scheduled sessions. Ultimately, 87 students who· were 
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tentatively classified as nondepressed, and 73 students 
who were tentatively classified as depressed 
participated in the second phase of the study. Since 
depression in college students may be a very transitory 
phenomenon (Hammen, 1980; Johnson, Petzel & Sperduto, 
1983), all of the subjects participated in the second 
phase of the study within two to three weeks of the 
initial screening. 
During the second phase of the study, the 
Depression Adjective Checklist (DACL; Lubin, 1965) was 
used in conjunction with a re-administration of the BDI 
in order to refine our criteria for classifying students 
as depressed or nondepressed. As with the BDI, high 
scores on the DACL are associated with depression. To 
select our final depressed sample, we eliminated from 
the analyses any subjects who fell below one standard 
deviation from the mean of the depressed group on the 
DACL. This resulted in a sample of 18 males and 40 
females who scored above 9 on the second administration 
of the BDI 
DACL (mean 
(mean 17 • 7) and who scored above 6 on the 
14. 5) • To select our final nondepressed 
sample, we eliminated from the analyses any subjects who 
scored above one standard deviation from the mean of the 
nondepressed group on the DACL. This resulted in a 
sample of 16 males and 28 females who scored below 5 on 
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the second administration of the BDI (mean 2.0) and who 
scored below 8 on the DACL (mean 3.1). 
All of the analyses discussed in 
section were conducted using the final 
depressed and 44 nondepressed subjects. 
Testing Materials 
Depression Adjective Checklist 
the results 
sample of 58 
The DACL (Lubin, 1965) is a self-report measure 
that consists of a list of 22 positive adjectives and 
ten negative adjectives. (This instrument is included in 
Appendix B.) Subjects are instructed to check all of 
the words that describe how they are feeling that day. 
It was designed as a measure of transient depressive 
mood. The DACL is suitable for group administration, 
and requires approximately three minutes to complete. 
There are 14 different versions of the DACL. 
The adjectives contained on these checklists were all 
empirically, rather than theoretically, derived in a 
two-step process. First, a pool of 171 adjectives 
suggesting various degrees of depression and euphoria 
were selected from dictionaries and books of synonyms. 
Second, all of the adjectives were then administered to 
male and female psychiatric groups with diagnoses of 
depression, as well as to male and female normal groups. 
Items for the various checklists were chosen from the 
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subset of adjectives which significantly differentiated 
the normal and depressed criterion groups. 
The present study employed checklist B which has 
split-half reliability coefficients (Lubin, 1965) of .92 
for nondepressed individuals, and .91 for depressed 
individuals. Lubin (1966) has also examined the 
concurrent validity of the DACL by correlating it with 
two other well-known measures of depression, the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-Depression 
Scale (MMPI-D; Hathaway & McKinley, 1951) and the Beck 
Depression Inventory (Beck, 1961) . He found that the 
DACL was significantly correlated with both measures, 
for normal as well as depressed subjects, thereby 
attesting to its concurrent validity. 
The DACL is scored by summing all of the 
negative items that were endorsed, and then adding to 
that total all of the positive items that were not 
endorsed. 
Beck Depression Inventory 
The BDI is a self-report questionnaire that is 
suitable for group administration. It contains 21 
multiple-choice statements covering a variety of 
affective, cognitive, motivational, and vegetative 
symptoms that are associated with clinical depression. 





to the intensity of the symptom. For 
first item contains the following 
I do not feel sad, (b) I feel sad or 
blue, (c) I am blue or sad all the time and I can't snap 
out of it, (d) I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand 
it." For each item subjects are instructed to circle 
the statement or statements that correspond to the way 
they are feeling that day. (A copy of this measure is 
included in Appendix C.) 
Employing a sample of 200 patients, Beck (1967) 
reported that the split-half reliability of the BDI is 
. 86. It has also been shown that BDI scores correlate 
significantly with psychiatric ratings of depression, 
from .61 to .67 (Beck, 1967; Metcalfe & Goldman, 1965; 
Nussbaum, Witting & Hanlon, 1963). Bumberry, Oliver, 
and McClure (1978) extended the generalizability of 
these findings by examining the reliability of the BDI 
as a measure of the severity of depression in college 
students. They found that the students' BDI scores were 
correlated significantly with psychiatric interview 
ratings. Similarly, Hammen (1980) found that BDI scores 
were correlated . 80 with clinical interview ratings, 
based on the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression, in a 
sample of college students. 
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Thematic Apperception Test 
Murray (1943) designed the TAT to measure 
narrative fantasy. The original version of the TAT 
required that subjects devise stories in response to 20 
ambiguous pictures. Murray's set of TAT cards have 
become a standard component of the assessment measures 
used by clinical psychologists in performing 
psychological evaluations. 
McClelland and his colleagues (e.g., McClelland 
& Atkinson, 1948; McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 
1953) introduced a number of modifications to the TAT 
which greatly enhanced its use as a research instrument, 
particularly with regard to the assessment of motive 
patterns. The present investigation employed this 
modified version of the TAT. Six pictures that have 
been found to be particularly useful in eliciting 
stories with themes of intimacy, achievement, and power 
(McAdams, 1980) were used in the present study. 
All of the TAT stories were scored for intimacy 
motivation using the scoring system developed by McAdams 
(1982). Scoring was done by a highly reliable(~> .85) 
coder who had mastered the practice stories in the 
scoring manual for the intimacy motive (1984). 
Similarly, all the of the stories were scored for 
achievement motivation by a trained, highly reliable (~ 
> .85) coder using the scoring 
McClelland, et al. (1953). 
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system developed by 
Personal Experiences Attribution Questionnaire (PEAQ) 
The PEAQ is adapted from two sources: the 
questionnaire used by Hammen and her colleagues (e.g., 
Gong-Guy and Hammen, 1980), and the abbreviated version 
of the life story interview developed by McAdams (1985). 
The PEAQ requires that subjects write brief descriptions 
of six positive and six negative experiences which have 
occurred in their 1 i ves. Further, they are asked to 
divide these experiences into two different types: 
achievement-oriented and interpersonally-oriented. 
Thus, subjects are asked to write 12 descriptions of the 
following four types: three positive interpersonal 
experiences, three negative interpersonal experiences, 
three positive achievement experiences, and three 
negative achievement experiences. Following their 
description of each event, subjects are asked to rate 
each event on seven-point scales corresponding to the 
attributional (internality, stability, globality, 
intentionality, and controllability), as well as 
nonattributional (upset, uncertainty, expectation, and 
recurrence) dimensions of Hammen's expanded model. The 
instructions for the PEAQ, as well as the questionnaire 
itself, are included in Appendix A. 
45 
In scoring the PEAQ, high scores for the 
negative events correspond to a depressive cognitive 
style. Thus, all high scores on the seven-point scales 
for the negative items indicate a high degree of the 
variable (e.g., highly internal, stable, global), with 
the exception of control; a high score on control 
indicates a lesser perception of control. For the 
positive events, on the other hand, all high scores on 
the seven-point scales correspond to a nondepressive 
cognitive style, with the exception of control; a high 
score on control indicates a lesser perception of 
control, which is indicative of a depressive cognitive 
style. Scores are obtained for positive achievement-
oriented, positive interpersonally-oriented, negative 
achievement-oriented, and negative interpersonally-
oriented events by summing the ratings of the three 
appropriate items for each category, and then dividing 
the sum by 3. 
Attributional Style Questionnaire 
As mentioned earlier, the ASQ (Peterson et al., 
1982) is a self-administered questionnaire that consists 
of 12 hypothetical positive and negative scenarios. 
Within the positive and negative categories, the 
scenarios are equally divided between achievement-
oriented and interpersonally-oriented events. In 
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completing the ASQ, subjects are instructed to imagine 
that they are experiencing the events described and to 
rate each event on seven-point scales corresponding to 
the three attributional dimensions (internality, 
stability, globality). In addition, they are asked to 
rate how important they would consider the event if it 
were to happen to them. (A copy of this instrument is 
included in Appendix D.) 
Internality is assessed by asking the subject to 
rate the extent to which each imagined event is "totally 
due to the other person or circumstances" versus 
"totally due to me." Stability is assessed by asking 
the subject to rate the extent to which each imagined 
event "will never again be present" versus "will always 
be present." Globality is assessed by asking the 
subject to rate the extent to which each event 
"influences just this particular situation" versus 
"influences all situations in my life." 
The three ratings of each cause are scored such 
that high scores are associated with increasing 
internality, stability, and globality. In the present 
study, scores were formed separately for the positive 
achievement, positive interpersonal, negative 
achievement, and negative interpersonal events by 
summing the appropriate items and dividing the sum by 3. 
Previous studies have generally collapsed the 
47 
achievement-oriented and interpersonally-oriented items 
together, and therefore examined attributions in 
response to positive and negative events without regard 
to the achievement or interpersonal context of the 
events. 
Peterson, Semmel, et al. ( 19 8 2) have reported 
that the individual scales of the ASQ have the following 
modest reliabilities using Cronbach's alpha: For good 
outcomes, internality = .50, stability = .58, globality 
= .44, and the composite (averaged across all three) = 
.75; for bad outcomes, internality = .46, stability = 
.59, globality = .69, and the composite = .72. 
Additionally, they reported that test-retest 
correlations over a five week period were significant 
for each attributional dimension, ranging from • 57 to 
.69. 
Procedure 
All subjects were administered the measures in 
small groups of approximately five students. The 
sessions were conducted by three different female 
experimenters who were knowledgeable about all aspects 
of the study, but blind to the BDI scores of the 
individual participants. Subjects were not informed 
about the basis for their selection as participants in 
this study. 
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The experimenter began each session by 
introducing herself to the group, and then providing a 
brief rationale for the study. The study was again 
described as "an investigation of the life events of 
college students." Subjects were then asked to complete 
an informed consent form which reiterated the fact that 
the study was anonymous, confidential, and voluntary. 
After all of the consent forms were collected, the 
experimenter distributed the DACL and the BDI to each 
subject. The experimenter briefly explained each 
measure, and then asked that the subjects read the 
instructions printed at the top of the measures. 
As soon as all of the subjects had completed 
both of the questionnaires, the experimenter provided 
verbal instructions for the TAT. Subjects were asked to 
write imaginative stories for each picture. They were 
informed that each picture would be shown for one 
minute, and that they would have an additional four 
minutes to write each story. Thus, they had a total of 
five minutes to write each story. Subjects were told 
that the purpose of this procedure was to encourage them 
to be as imaginative as possible. In order to provide 
some guidelines for their story-writing, subjects were 
asked to include the following information in their 
stories: (1) what lead up to the event in the picture, 
(2) what is happening at the moment, (3) what the 
49 
characters are thinking and feeling, and ( 4) how the 
story turns out in the end. Finally, subjects were 
assured that this is a very subjective task, and that 
there are no right or wrong stories. At this point, the 
experimenter handed out booklets containing written 
instructions for the TAT, followed by six blank pages. 
Subjects were asked to write each story on a separate 
page in the booklet. In addition, the cover sheet of 
each booklet requested a few items of demographic 
information, which all subjects were asked to complete. 
At this point, the experimenter asked if there were any 
questions, and then proceeded to show the six TAT 
slides. The administration of the TAT required 
approximately 40 minutes. 
Following the TAT, subjects were given the 
questionnaires for the PEAQ and for the ASQ. Subjects 
were provided with both verbal and written instructions 
for the two measures, and then asked to complete them at 
their own pace. In view of the fact that the PEAQ is a 
lengthy, somewhat complex questionnaire, the 
experimenter provided very detailed instructions, and 
then attempted to verify whether each subject had 
understood the instructions. This was accomplished 
primarily by questioning students who had puzzled looks 
on their faces, and also by walking around the room 
after the subjects had been working on the questionnaire 
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for about 15 minutes, and asking each student if he or 
she was having any problems with it. Most subjects 
required approximately 1 1/2 to 2 hours to complete the 
PEAQ, and 20 to 30 minutes to complete the ASQ. 
As each subject finished the ASQ, he or she was 
thanked for participating, and then informed about the 
number of credits that had been earned in the 
experiment. The entire procedure lasted approximately 2 
1/2 to 3 hours. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The results will be discussed in four sections 
corresponding to the four major problems discussed in 
Chapter II. In the first section, the following two 
major questions are addressed: Is there evidence of a 
depressive attributional style according to the 
predictions of the learned helplessness model? Is there 
evidence of a depressive attributional style according 
to the predictions of Hammen's expanded model? Both of 
these models hinge on the relation between cognitions 
for negative events and depression. In the second 
section, the question- Is there a depressive 
attributional style for positive events?- is examined. 
In the third section, the major question of interest is: 
Are there differences in depressive cognitive style for 
achievement-oriented versus interpersonally-oriented 
events? In the fourth section, the question of the 
relative merits of measures for hypothetical versus 
real-life events is addressed. 
Each section will begin with a summary of 
relevant descriptive statistics, which will be followed 
by a description of the specific analyses that were 




In describing the results of the study, two 
introductory statements are necessary. First, although 
the examination of gender differences was not a major 
focus of the current investigation, potential 
differences between males and females were examined in 
each of the analyses. There were no significant 
differences between males and females on any of the 
dimensions of depressive cognitive style. Consequently, 
gender differences are not discussed in the analyses. 
The second introductory remark refers to a 
problem in the PEAQ that became apparent following a 
summary investigation of the data. The items designed 
to assess self-intentionality and other-intentionality 
on the PEAQ were worded such that subjects were asked to 
choose between the two-- that is, they were asked to 
decide whether they intended for the event to occur, or 
whether other people intended for the event to occur. 
Some subjects described some of their events as being 
both self-intended and other-intended. Thus, for the 
negative events, 63 subjects rated these events as being 
primarily intended by others, and 68 subjects rated the 
event as being primarily self-intended. Twenty-nine 
subjects described these events as both primarily self-
intended and primarily other-intended. For the positive 
events, 78 subjects described the events as primarily 
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self-intended, and 49 subjects rated these events as 
primarily other-intended. Twenty-five subjects 
described these events as both primarily self-intended 
and primarily other-intended. Clearly, these findings 
suggest that many of the subjects were confused about 
these i terns on the questionnaire. 
items were excluded from all 
Consequently, these 
of the multivariate 
analyses. They were, however, included in univariate 
analyses, but these should be interpreted with caution. 
The Learned Helplessness Model and Hammen's Expanded 
Model: Attributions for the Causes and Consequences of 
Negative Events 
First, the mean attribution 
(internality, stability, globality) across 
ratings 
the six 
negative events on the ASQ were examined to determine 
whether there was any evidence to support the learned 
helplessness model's contention that depressed 
individuals are more internal, stable, and global in 
their attributions for the causes of negative events. 
The means and standard deviations are reported in Table 
1. All of the means were in the predicted direction, 
with depressed individuals evidencing a higher degree of 




Means and standard Deviations for Attributional 
cognitions Based on ASO Scores for Negative Events 
cognition M SD 
Internal 
All (101) 4.27 .79 
Nondepressed (44) 4.19 .82 
Depressed (57) 4.32 .77 .69 
Stable 
All (101) 4.12 .81 
Nondepressed (44) 3.91 .72 
Depressed (57) 4.28 .85 5.37* 
Global 
All (101) 4.03 .93 
Nondepressed (44) 3.69 1.00 
Depressed (57) 4.29 .88 10.40** 
a Direction of high scores always corresponds to a 
depressive cognitive style. Thus, all high scores on 
the 7-point scales indicate a high degree of the 
variable, with the exception of control; a high score on 
control indicates a lesser perception of control. 
b All E-values are for comparisons between depressed and 
nondepressed groups. · 
* l2 < .05 ** l2 < .01 *** l2 < .001 
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A second summary analysis of the learned 
helplessness model was conducted by examining the mean 
attribution ratings for 
globality across the six 
Additionally, the mean 
internality, stability, and 
negative events on the PEAQ. 
attribution ratings on the 
dimensions of self-intentionality, other-intentionality, 
and, control were examined to test the predictions of 
Hammen's expanded model. The means and standard 
deviations for the attributional ratings on the PEAQ are 
reported in Table 2. For the most part, the means were 
in the predicted direction, with depressed individuals 
exhibiting a higher degree of the depressive causal 
attributions, and also perceiving less control over 
negative outcomes. Attributions regarding the 
intentionality of others were not in the predicted 
direction; depressed individuals rated the actions of 
others as being less intentional for negative events 
than did the nondepressed individuals.. However, this 
difference was nonsignificant E(1,61) = 1.29, ~> .05. 
In order to test whether there was support for 
the overarching construct of a depressive attributional 
style for negative events, an overall multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted using the 
attributional dimensions of both the ASQ (internal, 
stable, global) and the PEAQ (internal, stable, global, 
control). Thus, the attributional dimensions served as 
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations for Attributional 
cognitions Based on PEAQ Scores for Negative Events 
cognition M SD r. 
Internal 
All (96) 4.10 1.00 
Nondepressed ( 40) 3.94 .96 
Depressed (56) 4.22 1.02 1.91 
stable 
All (96) 3.92 1. 01 
Nondepressed ( 40) 3.82 .97 
Depressed (56) 3.99 1.03 .66 
Global 
All ( 96) 3.91 1.03 
Nondepressed ( 40) 3.44 .87 
Depressed (56) 4.26 1.02 17.26** 
Self-intentional 
All (68) 3.50 1. 09 
Nondepressed (27) 3.02 1. 33 
Depressed ( 41) 3.81 .89 8.65** 
Other-intentional 
All (63) 2.82 .90 
Nondepressed ( 20) 3.00 .88 
Depressed ( 43) 2.73 .91 1.29 
Control 
All (96) 3.92 1.09 
Nondepressed ( 40) 3.78 .90 
Depressed (56) 4.01 1.21 1. 08 
a Direction of high scores always corresponds to a 
depressive cognitive style. Thus, all high scores on 
the 7-point scales indicate a high degree of the 
variable, with the exception of control; a high score on 
control indicates a lesser perception of control. 
b All r_-values are for comparisons between depressed 
and nondepressed groups. 
* 12 < .05 ** 12 < .01 *** 12 < .001 
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the dependent variables, and level of depression 
(depressed, nondepressed) served as the independent 
variable. The overall multivariate analysis using 
Wilks's criterion was highly significant, E(7,94) = 
3.41, R. < .01, indicating that depressed and 
nondepressed individuals differed overall in their 
attributional ratings of the causes of negative events. 
Given that the multivariate test was 
significant, the univariate differences between the 
groups were examined in order to determine which of the 
attributional dimensions were responsible for the 
overall significant effect. These are reported in Table 
1 and Table 2. In terms of the attributional ratings of 
the hypothetical events on the ASQ (refer to Table 1), 
depressed individuals perceived the causes of negative 
events to be significantly more stable (E(1,99) = 5.47, 
R < .05) and global (E(1,99) = 10.40, R < .01) than did 
nondepressed controls. There were no significant 
differences between depressed and nondepressed 
individuals for the internal dimension. In terms of the 
- . ·~ ....... 
attributional ratings of the real-life events on) the 
PEAQ (refer to Table 2), depressed individuals perceived 
the causes of negative events to be significantly more 
global (E(1,94) = 17.26, R < .001) than did nondepressed 
controls. There were no significant differences between 
depressed and nondepressed subjects for the dimensions 
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of internality, stability, or controllabil~ty. Thus, 
these results provided partial support for the 
contentions of the reformulated learned helplessness 
model with regard to attributions for negative events. 
Next, the nonattributional cognitions for the 
consequences of negative events were examined. The mean 
cognition ratings across the six negative events on the 
PEAQ were computed for the dimensions of uncertainty, 
upset, recurrence, and expectation. These means and 
their standard deviations are reported in Table 3. For 
the most part, the means are all in the predicted 
direction, with depressed people reporting more 
uncertainty and upset in response to negative events, 
and also predicting the recurrence of similar negative 
events in the future. Contrary to the prediction, 
however, nondepressed individuals expected that their 
negative experiences would occur more than did depressed 
individuals. However, this difference was extremely 
small, and nonsignificant, E = .19, p > .05. 
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
carried out using all of the nonattributional dimensions 
of Hammen's expanded model (uncertainty, upset, 
recurrence, and expectation) as dependent variables, and 
level of depression (depressed, nondepressed) as the 
independent variable. This analysis was performed in 
order to test whether or not there was support for the 
59 
construct of a depressive cognitive style for the 
consequences of negative events. As expected, the 
overall MANOVA using Wilks's criterion was significant, 
E(4,91) = 5.00, ~< .01. This indicates that depressed 
and nondepressed individuals differed overall in their 
nonattributional ratings about the consequences of 
negative events. 
Given that the multivariate test was 
significant, the univariate comparisons of the 
nonattributional dimensions were examined. These are 
reported in Table 3. Based on accounts of their own 
negative experiences, depressed individuals reported 
feeling more uncertain (E(1,91) = 25.63, ~ < .001) and 
more upset (E(1,93) = 6.80, ~ < .05) in response to 
these experiences than did nondepressed subjects. In 
addition, depressed individuals were more likely to 
predict the recurrence (E(1,94) = 15.36, ~ < .001) of 
similar negative experiences 
mentioned previously, there 
differences between the groups 
in the future. As 
were no significant 
with regard to the 
expectation of negative events. Thus, these results 
provided strong support for the hypothesis that there 
are difference between depressed and nondepressed 
individuals in their cognitions regarding the 
consequences of negative events. 
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for Nonattributional 
cognitions Based on PEAQ Scores for Negative Events 
cognition M SD :r 
uncertainty 
All (93) 3.60 1.24 
Nondepressed (39) 2.91 1.17 
Depressed (54) 4.09 1.06 25.63*** 
U}2Set 
All (94) 5.39 .97 
Nondepressed ( 39) 5.09 .93 
Depressed (55) 5.60 .95 6.80* 
Recurrence 
All (96) 3.43 1.09 
Nondepressed ( 40) 2.96 .94 
Depressed (56) 3.78 1. 06 15.36*** 
Ex12ectation 
All (95) 3.01 .86 
Nondepressed ( 40) 3.06 .76 
Depressed (55) 2.98 .94 .19 
a Direction of high scores always corresponds to a 
depressive cognitive style. Thus, all high scores on 
the 7-point scales indicate a high degree of the 
variable. 
b All .:r-values are for comparisons between depressed 
and nondepressed groups. 
* 12 < .05 ** 12 < .01 *** 12 < .001 
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The Role of Cognitions for Positive Events 
First, the mean attribution ratings (internal, 
stable, global) across the six positive events on the 
ASQ were examined to assess whether there was any 
general support for the notion of a depressive 
attributional style for positive events. The means and 
standard deviations are reported in Table 4. All of the 
means were in the predicted direction, with depressed 
people acknowledging more external, unstable, and 
specific attributions for the causes of positive events. 
Next, the mean attribution ratings (internal, 
stable, global, control, self-intentional, other-
intentional) across the six negative events on the PEAQ 
were examined. These means and standard deviations are 
reported in Table 5. All of the means were in the 
predicted direction, with depressed people rating the 
causes of their own personal negative events as more 
external, unstable, and specific, less intended by 
oneself, less intended by others, and less controllable. 
To examine the overall construct of a depressive 
attributional style for positive events, a MANOVA was 
conducted with all of the attributional variables from 
the ASQ (internal, stable, global) and all of the 
attributional variables from the PEAQ (internal, stable, 
global, control) as dependent variables, and level of 
depression (depressed, nondepressed) as the independent 
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Table 4 
Means and standard Deviations for Attributional 
cognitions Based on ASQ Scores for Positive Events 
Cognition M so 
Internal 
All (101) 5.24 .94 
Nondepressed (44) 5.42 .77 
Depressed (57) 5.11 1. 05 2.78 
stable 
All (101) 5.30 .77 
Nondepressed (44) 5.44 .63 
Depressed (57) 5.19 .86 2.53 
Global 
All (101) 5.12 .93 
Nondepressed (44) 5.31 .78 
Depressed (57) 4.96 1.02 3.54 
a Direction 
nondepressive 
scores on the 
the variable. 
of high scores always corresponds to a 
attributional style. Thus, all high 
7-point scales indicate a high degree of 
b All !:-values are for comparisons between depressed 
and nondepresed groups. 
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
63 
Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations for Attributional 
Cognitions Based on PEAO Scores for Positive Events 
Cognition M SD 
Internal 
All (95) 4.12 1.02 
Nondepressed ( 40) 4.53 1. 04 
Depressed (55) 3.82 .90 12.93** 
Stable 
All (96) 4.77 1. 07 
Nondepressed ( 40) 4.98 .93 
Depressed (56) 4.63 1.14 2.52 
Global 
All (95) 4.60 1.02 
Nondepressed ( 40) 4.47 1.13 
Depressed (55) 4.69 .92 1.05 
Self-intentional 
All (79) 5.20 .91 
Nondepressed (34) 5.37 .84 
Depressed ( 45) 5.08 .95 2.05 
Other-intentional 
All (50) 3.70 .88 
Nondepressed (14) 4.01 1.00 
Depressed (36) 3.58 .81 2.50 
Control 
All (96) 3.83 1.20 
Nondepressed ( 40) 3.22 .86 
Depressed (56) 4.25 1.23 20.84*** 
a Direction of high scores always corresponds to a 
nondepressive cognitive style, with the exception of 
control. Thus, all high scores on the 7 -point scales 
indicate a high degree of the variable, with the 
exception of control; a high score on control indicates 
a lesser perception of control. 
b All E.-values are for comparisons between depressed 
and nondepressed groups. 
* l2 < .05 ** l2 < .01 *** l2 < .001 
64 
variable. As expected, the MANOVA was highly 
significant, £:(7,94) = 6.21, R < .001 using Wilks's 
criterion. This indicates that depressed and 
nondepressed individuals differed overall in their 
attributional ratings of positive events. 
Given that the overall multi variate test was 
significant, the univariate comparisons for each of the 
attributional variables were examined. These are 
reported in Table 4 and Table 5. In terms of the 
attributional ratings of hypothetical positive events on 
the ASQ, there were no significant differences between 
depressed and nondepressed individuals with regard to 
the dimensions of internality, stability, or globality. 
In terms of the attributional ratings of real-life 
positive events on the PEAQ, depressed individuals rated 
these events as being more externally caused, £:(1,93) = 
12.93, !2 < .01 and as less controllable, £:(1,94) = 
20.84, !2 < .001 than did nondepressed individuals. 
There were no significant differences between depressed 
and nondepressed individuals with regard to the 
dimensions of stability or globality. Thus, there was 
relatively weak support for the reformulated learned 
helplessness model with regard to attributions for 
positive events. 
Following this, the question of whether there 









First the mean 
across the six 
positive events were examined. The means and standard 
deviations for the nonattributional cognitions are 
reported in Table 6. For the most part the means were 
in the predicted direction, with depressed individuals 
rating positive events as less expected, less likely to 
recur, and as creating more uncertainty in their lives 
than nondepressed individuals. Contrary to prediction, 
however, depressed individuals rated their positive 
events as being more happy than did nondepressed 
controls. However, this difference was quite small, and 
nonsignificant. 
In order to assess the construct of a depressive 
cognitive style in response to the consequences of 
positive events, a MANOVA was conducted using the 
nonattributional cognitions of uncertainty, upset, 
recurrence, and expectation as dependent variables, and 
level of depression (depressed, nondepressed) as the 
independent variable. In support of Hammen's expanded 
model, the overall MANOVA was highly significant 
(E(4,91) = 8.09, p < .001) using Wilks's criterion. 
This suggests that depressed and nondepressed 
individuals differed overall in their nonattributional 
ratings of the consequences of positive events. 
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Table 6 
Means and Standard Deviations for Nonattributional 
Cognitions Based on PEAQ Scores for Positive Events 
Cognition M SD .r 
Uncertainty 
All (93) 3.03 1. 05 
Nondepressed (39) 2.52 .87 
Depressed (54) 3.39 1. 03 18.26*** 
Ha:g:giness 
All (95) 5.75 1.17 
Nondepressed ( 40) 5.73 1.22 
Depressed (55) 5.77 1.14 .05 
Recurrence 
All (96) 4.31 1. 08 
Nondepressed ( 40) 4.33 1.17 
Depressed (56) 4.30 1. 02 .01 
Ex:gectation 
All (94) 3.79 .95 
Nondepressed (39) 3.92 .97 
Depressed (55) 3.70 .93 1.15 
a Direction of high scores always corresponds to a 
nonde:gressive cognitive style, with the exception of 
uncertainty; a high score on uncertainty indicates a 
greater perception of uncertainty. Thus, all high 
scores on the 7-point scales indicate a high degree of 
the variable. 
b All .r-values are for comparisons between depressed 
and nondepressed groups. 
* R < .05 ** R < .01 *** R < .001 
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Following the multivariate analysis, the 
univariate comparisons for each of the nonattributional 
variables were examined in order to determine which of 
the dimensions were responsible for the overall 
significant effect. The univariate E values are 
reported in Table 6. These comparisons revealed that 
the only significant difference between depressed and 
nondepressed individuals occurred for the dimension of 
uncertainty (E(1,91) = 18.26, R < .001). Thus, depressed 
individuals felt more uncertain as a consequence of 
positive events, than did nondepressed individuals. They 
were not, however, any less happy, nor did they have 
less of an expectation that these positive events were 
going to occur, or less confidence in the recurrence of 
similar positive events in the future. Thus, these 
results provided partial support for the contention that 
there are differences between depressed and nondepressed 
individuals with regard to their perceptions of the 
consequences of positive events. 
The Role of Cognitions for Achievement-oriented versus 
Interpersonally-oriented Events 
Are there different patterns of 
cognitions for interpersonally-oriented as 
depressive 
opposed to 
achievement-oriented events? To approach this question 
in a general way, summary means and standard deviations 
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for the negative ASQ-attributions, negative PEAQ-
attributions, and negative PEAQ-nonattributional 
cognitions within achievement-oriented and 
interpersonally-oriented events are reported in Table 7, 
Table 8, and Table 9. Summary means and standard 
deviations for the positive ASQ-attributions, positive 
PEAQ-attributions, and positive PEAQ-nonattributional 
cognitions within achievement-oriented and 
interpersonally events are reported in Table 10, Table 
11 and Table 12. 
As a more rigorous test of the possibility that 
there might be overall differences in depressive 
cognitive style for different types of events, a series 
of four MANOVAS was conducted with level of depression 
(depressed, nondepressed) as the between-subjects factor 
and type of event (achievement, interpersonal) as a 
repeated measure. 
The first analysis was carried out with the 
negative attributional dimensions from the ASQ 
(internal, stable, global) and the negative 
attributional dimensions of the PEAQ (internal, stable, 
global, control) as dependent variables. The second 
analysis was carried out with the negative 
nonattributional dimensions of uncertainty, upset, 
recurrence, and expectation as the dependent variables. 
The third analysis was carried out with the positive 
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Table 7 
Means and standard Deviations for Attributional 
Cognitions Based on ASO Scores within Negative 
Achievement and Interpersonal Events 
Achievement Events Interpersonal Events 
Cognition 
Internal 
All (101) 4.33 1.12 4.20 1. 08 
ND ( 44) 4.14 1. 09 4.24 1. 06 
D (57) 4.49 1.13 4.16 1.11 
Stable 
All (101) 4.23 1.10 4.01 .85 
ND (44) 3.89 .95 3.93 .86 
D (57) 4.49 1.14 4.08 .85 
Global 
All (101) 4.09 1.20 3.97 1. 24 
ND ( 44) 3.63 1.15 3.75 1. 33 
D (57) 4.45 1.12 4.14 1.15 
a Direction of high scores always corresponds to a 
depressive attributional style. Thus, all high scores 
on the 7-point scales indicate a high degree of the 
variable. 
b ND = Nondepressed D = Depressed 
70 
Table 8 
Means and standard Deviations for Attributional 
Cognitions Based on PEAO Scores Within Negative 
Achievement and Interpersonal Events 
Achievement Events Interpersonal Events 
------------------------------------------
Cognition M SD M SD 
--------------------------------------------------------
Internal 
All ( 96) 4.25 1.51 3.96 1. 08 
ND ( 40) 4.22 1.32 3.65 1.20 
D (56) 4.27 1. 65 4.18 .94 
Stable 
All (96) 4.12 1.25 3.72 1.24 
ND ( 40) 3.85 1.17 3.79 1.18 
D (56) 4.31 1.28 3.67 1.28 
Global 
All (96) 3.80 1.21 4.03 1.19 
ND ( 4 0) 3.35 1.08 3.52 1. 02 
D (56) 4.12 1.20 4.39 1.18 
Self-intention 
All (76) 3.39 1.29 3.71 1. 33 
ND (33) 2.87 1.48 3.43 1.55 
D (43) 3.79 .97 3.88 1.16 
Other-intention 
All (75) 2.66 1.21 3.18 1.14 
ND (26) 2.96 1.34 3.40 1. 09 
D (49) 2.50 1.13 3.05 1.16 
Control 
All ( 96) 3.77 1.51 4.07 1. 36 
ND ( 40) 3.60 1.36 3.96 1.29 
D (56) 3.88 1. 61 4.14 1.42 
a Direction of high scores always corresponds to a 
depressive attributional style. Thus, all high scores 
on the 7-point scales indicate a high degree of the 
variable, with the exception of control; a high score on 
control indicates a lesser perception of control. 
b ND = Nondepressed D = Depressed 
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Table 9 
Means and standard Deviations for Nonattributional 
cognitions Based on PEAQ Scores Within Negative 
Achievement and Interpersonal Events 
Achievement Events Interpersonal Events 
Cognition 
Uncertainty 
All (93) 3.44 1. 39 (93) 3.76 1. 38 
ND (39) 2.65 1.15 (39) 3.18 1.36 
D (54) 4.01 1.27 (54) 4.17 1.24 
Upset 
All (96) 5.34 1.11 (94) 5.45 1.19 
ND ( 40) 5.05 1. 06 (39) 5.18 1.25 
D (56) 5.55 1.11 (55) 5.65 1.11 
Recurrence 
All (96) 3.41 1. 33 (96) 3.46 1.27 
ND ( 40) 3.01 1.10 ( 40) 2.91 1.22 
D (56) 3.71 1.42 (56) 3.85 1.17 
Expectation 
All (95) 3.09 1.13 (95) 2.93 1.14 
ND ( 4 0) 3.11 .93 ( 40) 3.02 1.04 
D (55) 3.07 1.26 (55) 2.88 1.22 
a Direction of high scores always corresponds to a 
depressive attributional style. Thus, all high scores 
on the 7-point scales indicate a high degree of the 
variable. 
b ND = Nondepressed D = Depressed 
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Table 10 
Means and standard Deviations for Attributional 
Cognitions Based on ASO Scores within Positive 
Achievement and Interpersonal Events 
Achievement Events Interpersonal Events 
Cognition M SD M SD 
--------------------------------------------------------
Internal 
All (101) 5.21 1.21 5.28 1. 08 
ND (44) 5.49 1.07 5.35 .92 
D (57) 4.99 1.28 5.23 1.19 
Stable 
All (101) 5.22 .91 5.38 .92 
ND (44) 5.36 .76 5.52 .77 
D (57) 5.12 1.01 5.27 1.02 
Global 
All (101) 5.15 1. 09 5.09 1.15 
ND (44) 5.38 .88 5.24 1. 02 
D (57) 4.97 1.20 4.96 1.23 
--------------------------------------------------------
a Direction of high scores always corresponds to a 
nondepressive cognitive style. 
b ND = Nondepressed D = Depressed 
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Table 11 
Means and Standard Deviations for Attributional 
Cognitions Based on PEAO Scores within Positive 
Achievement and Interpersonal Events 
Achievement Events Interpersonal Events 
------------------------------------------
Cognition M so M so 
--------------------------------------------------------
Internal 
All (95) 4.28 1.52 (96) 3.96 1.16 
ND ( 40) 5.02 1.38 ( 40) 4.05 1.00 
D (55) 3.75 1.41 (56) 3.89 1.26 
stable 
All (96) 5.08 1.26 (96) 4.47 1.52 
ND ( 40) 5.29 1.13 ( 40) 4.66 1.13 
D (56) 4.92 1.33 (56) 4.33 1. 74 
Global 
All (95) 4.59 1.27 (101) 4.61 1.14 
ND ( 40) 4.48 1.39 ( 40) 4.46 1.25 
D (55) 4.66 1.18 (56) 4.72 1. 06 
Self-intention 
All ( 90) 5.49 1.18 (83) 4.89 1.24 
ND (38) 5.56 1. 08 (35) 5.12 1. 03 
D (52) 5.44 1.25 (48) 4.72 1.36 
Other-intention 
All (58) 3.89 1.45 (69) 3.62 1.42 
ND (18) 4.36 1.82 (26) 4.03 1.82 
D ( 40) 3.67 1.21 (43) 3.37 1. 05 
Control 
All (97) 3.68 1. 71 (96) 4.01 1.24 
NO ( 41) 3.04 1. 46 ( 40) 3.50 .92 
D (56) 4.14 1. 74 (56) 4.37 1. 32 
a Direction of high scores always corresponds to a 
nondepressive cognitive style, with the exception of 
control; a high score on control indicates a lesser 
perception of control. 
b ND = Nondepressed D = Depressed 
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Table 12 
Means and standard Deviations for Nonattributional 
Cognitions Based on PEAO Scores Within Positive 
Achievement and Interpersonal Events 
Achievement Events Interpersonal Events 
Cognition 
Uncertainty 
All (95) 2.32 1.23 (94) 2.21 1.19 
NO (39) 1.87 1. 07 ( 39) 2.05 1. 02 
D (56) 2.63 1.25 (55) 2.31 1.29 
Happiness 
All (96) 5.76 1.38 (95) 5.75 1.28 
NO ( 40) 5.80 1.45 ( 40) 5.65 1. 32 
D (56) 5.74 1.34 (55) 5.83 1.25 
Recurrence 
All (96) 4.15 1.51 (96) 4.47 1. 31 
NO ( 40) 4.37 1.53 ( 40) 4.28 1.34 
D (56) 3.99 1.49 (56) 4.61 1.27 
Expectation 
All (94) 4.01 1.12 (96) 3.54 1. 32 
NO ( 39) 4.17 1. 05 ( 40) 3.64 1. 25 
D (55) 3.90 1.17 (56) 3.47 1.38 
--------------------------------------------------------
a Direction of high scores always corresponds to a 
nondepressive attributional style, with the exception of 
uncertainty; a high score on uncertainty indicates a 
greater perception of uncertainty. Thus, all high scores 
on the 7-point scales indicate a high degree of the 
variable. 
b NO = Nondepressed D = Depressed 
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attributional dimensions of the ASQ and the positive 
attributional dimensions of the PEAQ as the dependent 
variables. The fourth analysis was carried out with the 
positive nonattributional dimensions of the PEAQ as the 
dependent variables. All of these repeated measures 
MANOVAS were nonsignificant, which indicates that there 
were no interactions between level of depression and 
type of event for which any of the attributional and 
nonattributional ratings were made. Thus, there were no 
differences between depressed and nondepressed 
individuals in their cognitive appraisals of 
achievement-oriented versus interpersonally-oriented 
events. Consequently, composite ratings which collapsed 
across achievement-oriented and interpersonally-
oriented items were used for the aforementioned analyses 
of attributional and nonattributional appraisals of 
positive and negative events. 
In order to test the hypothesis that motives 
might serve as mediating variables in the relation 
between depression and cognitive style for achievement-
oriented versus interpersonally-oriented events, all of 
the repeated measures MANOVAS were conducted with two 
additional between subjects factors: level of intimacy 
motivation (low, high) and level of achievement 
motivation (low, high). Subjects who had intimacy motive 
scores below the median score for the entire sample (n= 
76 
102) were classified as "low" in intimacy motivation. 
subjects who had intimacy motive scores above the median 
score for the entire sample were classified as "high" in 
intimacy motivation. The same procedure was followed for 
the classification of achievement motive scores. These 
analyses were employed to test the following 
predictions: that depressed subjects who are high in 
intimacy motivation would exhibit more of a depressive 
cognitive style for interpersonal, as opposed to 
achievement events; and, that depressed subjects who are 
high in achievement motivation would exhibit more of a 
depressive cognitive style for achievement, as opposed 
to interpersonal events. Thus, these hypotheses 
required an examination of the three-way interaction 
between level of depression, level of motive, and type 
of event. 
In order to understand what is meant by these 
predictions, refer to Table 13, which contains a 
hypothetical illustration of one of the predictions. If 
it were the case, for example, that depressed 
individuals who are high in achievement motivation 
manifest more of a depressive attributional style for 
negative achievement-oriented, as opposed to 
interpersonally-oriented events, then you might see the 
following pattern of scores for any of the attributional 
dimensions (e.g., stability): For the achievement 
Table 13 
Hypothetical Mean Stability Ratings for Subjects with 






















a Note. These are hypothetical distributions based on 
the prediction that depressed individuals who are high 
in achievement motivation manifest more of a depressive 
attributional style for negative achievement-oriented, 
as opposed to interpersonally-oriented events. 
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events, the highest globality rating would be found in 
the high depression, high achievement motivation cell 
(e.g., 5. O) and the lowest globality rating would be 
found in the low depression, low achievement motivation 
cell (e.g., 3.0). These numbers would signify an 
interaction between achievement motivation and 
depression for the negative achievement-oriented events. 
For the interpersonal events, on the other hand, there 
would be no interaction between achievement motivation 
and depression, with the result that there would be no 
interpretable pattern in the mean scores (e.g. , high 
depression, high achievement motivation = 4.0; low 
depression, low achievement motivation= 4.0). 
For each of the two motives, four analyses were 
conducted: one with negative attributional dimensions as 
the dependent variables, one with negative 
nonattributional dimensions as the dependent variables, 
one with positive attributional dimensions as the 
dependent variables, and one with positive 
nonattributional dimensions as the dependent variables. 
Of these eight analyses, two had significant 
multivariate interactions. 
First, there was a significant three-way 
interaction between depression, achievement motivation, 
and type of event for the negative attributional 
dimensions (E(7,93) = 2.87, R <.05). Following this 
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significant multivariate test, an examination of the 
univariate comparisons revealed that there were 
significant differences in internality ratings on the 
ASQ (~(1,98) = 11.48, R < .01) and in stability ratings 
on the PEAQ (~(1,98) = 6.44, R <.05) for achievement-
oriented versus interpersonally-oriented events. A 
closer examination of the mean internality scores on the 
ASQ revealed that the configuration of internality 
scores within each type of event did not conform to the 
expected pattern. A closer examination of the mean 
stability scores on the PEAQ, however, as illustrated in 
Table 14, showed that the pattern of scores did 
correspond to the predicted pattern. That is, within 
the negative achievement events, the highest stability 
rating occurred for the high depression, high 
achievement motivation cell (M = 4.42). For these same 
events, there was a significantly lower mean stability 
rating for the low depression, low achievement 
motivation cell (M = 4.19). For the negative 
interpersonal events, on the other hand, the mean 
stability ratings showed no interpretable pattern. 
Therefore, these scores indicate that, as predicted, 
there was an interaction between achievement motivation 
and level of depression for the achievement-oriented 
events, while there was no interaction between 
achievement motivation and level of depression for the 
Table 14 
Mean Stability Ratings on the PEAQ for Subjects with 























interpersonal events. Thus, for the stable-unstable 
ratings of real-life negative events, there was support 
for the hypothesis that depressed individuals who are 
high in achievement motivation manifest more of a 
depressive cognitive style for achievement-oriented, as 
opposed to interpersonally-oriented events. However, 
this finding is complicated by the fact that the Box's M 
multivariate test for the homogeneity of dispersion 
matrices revealed that the statistical assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was violated by these data for 
the stable-unstable dimension. Consequently, given that 
there is not the same number of cases in each group, the 
statistical validity of the conclusion drawn from this 
data is questionable (Hays, 1981). 
There was also a significant three-way 
interaction between depression, intimacy motivation, and 
type of event for the positive attributional dimensions 
(E (7,93) = 2.20, ~ < .05). Following this significant 
multivariate test, an examination of the univariate 
comparisons revealed a significant difference in 
globality ratings on the PEAQ for achievement-oriented 
versus interpersonally-oriented positive events 
(E(1,98) = 8.59, ~ <.01). However, an examination of the 
mean globality scores within both the achievement-
oriented and interpersonally-oriented events showed that 
the pattern of scores did not correspond to the 
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predicted pattern. The mean globality scores for the 
positive achievement-oriented and the positive 
interpersonally-oriented items are illustrated in Table 
15. Given that these were positive experiences, it was 
expected that for the interpersonal events the lowest 
global i ty rating would occur for the high depression, 
high intimacy motivation cell. As you can see, in fact, 
this cell had the highest rating ( M = 4.75). 
Therefore, despite the significant multivariate finding, 
the hypothesis that depressed individuals who are high 
in intimacy motivation would manifest a more depressive 
attributional style for interpersonal, as opposed to 
achievement events was not confirmed. 
Additionally, in order to test the prediction 
that there is an inverse relation between depression and 
intimacy motivation, a t-test was conducted to determine 
whether there was a difference in intimacy motive scores 
for the depressed and nondepressed groups. Contrary to 
the prediction, the difference was nonsignificant (t 
=.66, ~ > .05) indicating that depressed and 
nondepressed students did not differ in intimacy 
motivation. 
Hypothetical Versus Real-life Events 
The second general aim of the study was to 
examine the relative merits of using measures of 
Table 15 
Mean Globality Ratings on the PEAO for Subjects with 

























hypothetical versus real-life events in assessing 
depressive cognitive style. This is a difficult question 
to answer on statistical grounds. Nevertheless, three 
types of evidence from the data will be presented that 
begin to address this issue, albeit in a fairly 
superficial manner. Some of the more substantial 
theoretical issues related to this question will be 
addressed in the discussion section. 
In comparing the merits of hypothetical versus 
real-life measures in the present study, it was only 
possible to examine attributional cognitions since the 
hypothetical measure employed-- the ASQ-- does not 
contain nonattributional items. 
First, in order to assess the relation between 
the ASQ and the PEAQ, the internal, stable, and global 
dimensions of the two questionnaires were correlated. 
These correlations are illustrated in Table 16. Of 
course, this type of analysis does not speak to the 
issue of the superiority of one type of measure over the 
other. From this analysis it can be seen, however, that 
the internal and global items of the two measures were 
significantly correlated with one another (~ = .23, R < 
.05; ~ = .21, R <.05, respectively), which provides some 
evidence that these two dimensions reflect the same 
underlying construct in 
other hand, although 
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statistically significant, they are quite low, which 
suggests that these scales measure something different 
as well. 
The second way in which some tentative 
conclusions were drawn regarding the relative utility of 
the two types of measures was by examining the number of 
attributional dimensions that showed significant 
differences between depressed and nondepressed 
individuals in each measure. In terms of the negative 
hypothetical events on the ASQ, both the stable and the 
global dimensions revealed significant differences 
between the groups. In terms of the real-life negative 
events on the PEAQ, however, only the global dimension 
revealed significant differences between the groups. 
This provides some evidence that hypothetical measures 
may be better suited to the task of uncovering 
attributional differences for negative events. 
For the positive events, on the other hand, an 
entirely different picture emerges. For the positive 
attributional items on the ASQ there were no significant 
differences between depressed and nondepressed 
individuals. For the positive attributional items on 
the PEAQ, however, there was a highly significant 
difference between depressed and nondepressed 
individuals for the internal dimension. Thus, for the 
positive events, the real-life attributional measure was 
87 
clearly superior to the hypothetical measure in 
discriminating between depressed and nondepressed 
individuals. 
The third way in which the utility of the two 
types of measures was compared was by conducting two 
linear function discriminant analyses. These analyses 
were performed in order to test the degree to which the 
attributional variables of the ASQ and the PEAQ are able 
to discriminate between depressed and nondepressed 
individuals. Both analyses employed the direct entry 
method of variable selection, which includes all of the 
entered variables in the analysis. The first analysis, 
which included all of the positive and negative 
internal, stable, and global scales of the ASQ resulted 
in the correct classification of 64.71% of the subjects 
as depressed or nondepressed. In the second analysis, 
which included the positive and negative internal, 
stable, and global scales of the PEAQ, 74.51% of the 
subjects were classified correctly. In order to 
determine whether there was a significant difference 
between these two proportions, a z-test was performed. 
The test indicated that the difference in proportions 
between the two groups was nonsignificant (Z = -.91, 2 > 
.05). Consequently, the discriminant analyses failed to 
reveal any differences between the two measures in terms 
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The present study, like the vast majority of 
studies that have examined the reformulated learned 
helplessness model of depression, provided partial 
support for the contention that depressed individuals· 
manifest a particular style of attributing causes for 
negative experiences. Specifically, when these 
attributions were asses-sed via a measure of hypothetical 
events- the ASQ- it was found that depressed individuals 
''····-···-r· .. 
made stable and glob~l, but pot internal, attributions 
for negative events. That is, they believed that the 
causes of these unfavorable events were likely to 
persist over time and to generalize across other 
situations. They did not believe, however, that they 
themselves would be the principle cause of the imagined 
unpleasant events. on the other hand, when these 
attributions were assessed via a measure of real-life 
events- the PEAQ- it was found that depressed 
individuals differed from nondepressed individuals only 
in their global attributions for negative events. Thus, 
the~ ____ b~Lie..'\le.d ...... that the causes of their own personal 
negative experiences were likely to have a similarly 
negative impact on other kinds of situations. 
Nevertheless, they did not view the causes of these 
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unfortuitous events as being self-induced or as likely 
to persist over time. Additionally, contrary to the 
predictions, depres~~<:l" _ind~viduaTs· did- not view their 
.~~··-·<~•'-"'"'· •-a ... --~--
personal _ __neg.at_ive events as any less controlla.ble than 
---~--- ~--------------~---·---'"·· -·-· ... -. 
did nondepressed individuals. In fact, both depressed 
ancr-·nondepre~~ed students viewed their negative life 
experiences ·._as moderately controllable. 
Several pertinent questions emerge from these 
data. First, why is it that both depressed and 
nondepressed students made slightly internal 
·--.__ 
attrTbut"ions for the causes of negative hypothetical and 
. re.al-life events? One possibility for the lack of 
significant differences on this dimension is that the 
generally poor reliabilty (e.g., Peterson, Semmel, et 
al., 1982) of internality measures minimizes the 
likelihood of finding any actual differences between the 
groups. A second possibility stems from Janoff-Bulman's 
(1979) argument that there are two subtypes of internal 
attributions: characterological self-blame and 
behavioral self-blame. Perhaps if the present study had 
examined differences in these subtypes, significant 
differences would have emerged for one particular kind 
of internal attribution. A third possibility is that 
there may be a social norm favoring internal causal 
explanations. Weary and his associates (Weary, 1979; 
Weary, Jordan, & Hill, 1985) have suggested that people, 
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in general, tend to attribute causality for positive and 
negative experiences in a way that will avoid 
embarrassment, gain social approval, or both. Perhaps 
it is simply more socially acceptable to acknowledge 
slight personal responsibility for negative outcomes in 
order to avoid presenting oneself in an unrealistically 
positive light. 
The theoretical ~ignificance of the lack of -----··-- ~--~ .. "-·-~·- -«-····---
-......_ ........ --·-'"•""'" 
depressed-no_z:ciepress~.9: differences on the internality 
dimension is somewhat unclear. While internal 
·-----~"· ..... , .. ~ .. "'"~·.. . . 
attributions for bad events are hypothesized to result 
in diminished self-esteem, these attributions are not 
thought to have any bearing on the onset or magnitude of 
depression (Peterson et al., 1985). As Peterson et al., 
(1985) state, " Internal attributions for bad events 
need show no necessary relationship with depression. 
Perhaps they sometimes do as a result of their 
occasional correlation with stable and global 
attributions" (p. 168). Thus, they imply that the 
~4Reernal-external dimension is less crucial to the 
reformulated learned helplessness theory than the stable 
and global dimensions. 
The second question that emerges from these data 
is: why do depressed individuals attribute negative 
hypothetical events to stable causes, while not 
attributing negative real-life events to stable causes? 
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This is consistent with the findings of Peterson et al., 
(1985) in their review of the published literature on 
depressive attributional style. They reported that 
studies which used measures of hypothetical, as opposed 
to real-life events were more likely to support the 
learned helplessness reformulation with respect to 
stable attributions. They noted, however, that one 
confounding factor was that studies of hypothetical 
events were also likely to employ significantly larger 
samples (M = 138 versus 73) than studies of real-life 
events. Consequently, it was impossible to determine 
whether the differences were attributable to sample size 
or to the type of measure employed. An additional 
complication is that studies of hypothetical events 
often assessed attributions across a larger number of 
events than did studies of real-life events. In the 
present study, given that a fairly large sample (n = 
102) was employed, and given that attributions were 
assessed across 12 events on both the hypothetical and 
the real-life measure, the differences between measures 
are probably not an artifact of the sample size or the 
number of events employed. Rather, it appears that 
depressed individuals reported that the causes of 
imagined unfavorable events were likely to persist over 
time, while they reported that the causes of their own 
personal negative experiences were somewhat more 
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transitory. One plausible reason for this phenomenon is 
that perhaps depressives tend to overestimate the 
stability of negative events when there is no actual 
evidence to the contrary. However, with real-life 
events that are reported retrospectively, they might 
have information regarding the actual time course of the 
events, thus providing evidence on which to base more 
realistic judgments of stability. 
The third question of interest is: why does the 
dimension of globality emerge so strongly as a 
depressj,ye. attribution on both measures? This finding 
_,, ,-• 
is contrary to Coyne and Gotlib's (1983) suggestion that 
the reformulation is more likely to be supported when 
events are hypothetical, as well as contrary to Peterson 
et al. 's (1985) finding that studies employing 
hypothetical events were more likely to show support for 
a depressive style of attributing negative events to 
global causes. Perhaps the dimension of globality is 
especially representative of the type of thought pattern 
which discriminates between depressed and nondepressed 
individuals. I!: seems reasonable to speculate that 
people ,who believe that every negative occurrence is 
likely to have a cascading effect on many other aspects 
of their lives, would consequently also be vulnerable to 
fe_elings--~-o-f- dep:r:-ession. The strength of the globality 
dimension may also reflect its ability to tap into the 
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kind of environmental stimulus that is likely to trigger 
a depressed mood, particularly for the relatively 
transient depressive episodes that are characteristic of 
depressed college students. That is, a number of bad 
things going wrong at the same time in a person's life 
might make that person feel depressed. 
It is also interesting to speculate about the 
reasons why the present study found a significant 
overall multivariate effect for attributions based on 
negative real-life experiences, since a similar study of 
attributions in a college population (Hammen & Cochran, 
1981) did not yield this effect. One difference between 
the two studies is that the Hammen and Cochran (1981) 
focused specifically on stressful events, while the 
present study focused more generally on failure events. 
Additionally , the present study assessed attributions 
across a slightly larger number of events (six versus 
five). One final difference is that the present study 
employed a larger depressed sample (58 versus 34). 
There is one additional aspect of the 
attributional findings in the present study that 
deserves mention. Although there were no formal 
predictions regarding the phenomenon of 
"evenhandedness," or a tendency for depressives to be 
neither positivistic nor negativistic in their 
evaluations, the present findings do, in fact, reflect 
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such a trend. That is, it appeared that the depressives 
maintained a relatively consistent evaluative stance for 
both positive and negative events. In comparison, 
nondepressed individuals tended to be more positivistic 
in their appraisals. Ruehlman and West (1985), in their 
review of the literature on depression, concluded that 
there is evidence that mildly depressed individuals are 
particularly likely to be evenhanded in their 
appraisals. In the present study, there was evidence 
that the depressives were evenhanded in their appraisals 
of stable and global causes on both the ASQ and the 
PEAQ, while the nondepressives were relatively 
positivistic in their appraisals of stable and global 
causes. 
Although the present study did not replicate 
Hammen and Cochran's failure to find depressed-
nondepressed attributional differences, it did garner 
substantial support for Hammen and her colleagues' 
(e.g., Gong-Guy & Hammen, 1980) contention that 
depressives differ from nondepressives with regard to 
cognitions related to the consequences of negative 
experiences. Specifically, depressed students reported 
feeling more uncertain and upset in response to negative 
experiences than did nondepressed students. It is 
noteworthy that Hammen and Cochran (1981) also found 
differences between depressed and nondepressed 
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individuals with regard to feelings of upset and 
uncertainty in response to negative events. Thus, the 
present study provided converging evidence for the 
importance of these two cognitive dimensions. 
Additionally, in the present study depressed students 
were more likely to anticipate the recurrence of similar 
negative experiences in the future. Contrary to 
prediction, however, depressed students were not more 
likely to indicate that they had expected that their 
negative experiences would occur. overall, these 
findings regarding students' appraisals of the 
consequences of unpleasant experiences suggest that 
while everyone experiences unpleasant events, depressed 
individuals may be particularly ill-equipped to cope 
with them, since they construe these experiences in 
rather maladaptive terms. 
One limitation of the present investigation is 
that it provides no way to assess objectively the 
negativity of these personal life events. Consequently, 
it is possible that the negative events of the depressed 
subjects were, in fact, more serious and unpleasant than 
those of the nondepressed subjects, and therefore were 
more likely to engender a large degree of upset and 
uncertainty. Additional research is needed to address 
the issue of the actual negativity of the life events of 
depressed versus nondepressed individuals. 
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The present study also investigated the role of 
cognitions related to the causes and consequences of 
positive events. As is often the case in research on 
the cognitive correlates of depression (see Coyne & 
Gotlib, 1983), there was partial, but relatively weak 
support for the contention that there is a depressive 
cognitive style associated with appraisals of positive 
events. In terms of the assessment of attributions for 
positive hypothetical events on the ASQ, there were no 
significant differences between depressed and 
nondepressed individuals on any of the dimensions. When 
these attributions were assessed via a measure of real-
life experiences, however, depressed individuals rated 
their own pleasant experiences as more external and less 
controllable than did nondepressed individuals. Thus, 
depressed individuals were less likely to acknowledge 
personal responsibility for their own successful 
experiences. 
It is noteworthy that the only significant 
attributional differences for positive events were found 
using the real-life, as opposed to the hypothetical 
measure. Some of the more behaviorally-oriented 
depression theorists, such as Lewinsohn (e.g. Lewinsohn, 
1974a; Lewinsohn, 1974b) and Rehm (1977) have argued 
rather convincingly that depressed individuals evaluate 
positive experiences differently than nondepressed 
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individuals. Lewinsohn (1974a) has proposed that 
depressed and nondepressed individuals differ with 
regard to the number and kinds of events that they are 
likely to perceive as potentially reinforcing. Along 
similar lines, Rehm (1977) has proposed that depressives 
characteristically bestow relatively low rates of self-
reward and relatively high rates of self-punishment. 
Although these two theories do not speak to the issue of 
the role of attributions for positive events, they lend 
some credence to the idea that there may be important 
differences between depressed and nondepressed 
individuals with regard to their perceptions of positive 
events. Consequently, the fact that a measure of real-
life experiences uncovered such differences while a 
measure of hypothetical events did not, suggests that 
real-life measures are better suited to this 
theoretically important task. 
In terms of the assessment of cognitive 
appraisals regarding the consequences of favorable 
personal experiences, depressed individuals reported 
that they felt more uncertain in response to positive 
outcomes than did nondepressed individuals. Contrary to 
the predictions, however, depressives were not any less 
happy in response to these events, nor did they have 
less of an expectation that these positive events were 
going to occur, or less of a belief that similarly 
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positive experiences would recur in the future. The 
fact that depressives seem somewhat uncertain, even in 
the face of ostensibly positive experiences, is rather 
intriguing. Perhaps depressed students feel 
particularly uncertain in general, and are not bolstered 
in their sense of certainty by the occurrence of 
positive events, even when these events confirm their 
expectations. 
The present study also examined the possibility 
that there might be differences in cognitive style for 
achievement-oriented versus interpersonally-oriented 
experiences. No overall differences for type of event 
were found on the hypothetical measure - the ASQ or on 
the real-life measure -the PEAQ. Perhaps one explanation 
for this is related to the characteristics of the 
subjects in the study. For college students, the tasks 
of developing significant relationships with members of 
the opposite sex, as well as choosing career goals are 
major endeavors. The college campus provides an 
environment which facilitates the cultivation of both of 
these aspects of identity development. Consequently, it 
seems reasonable to suspect that college students are at 
a developmental period in which interpersonal and 
achievement concerns are intricately intertwined. As a 
result, it may be difficult to detect differences in 
cognitive appraisals for these two kinds of experiences. 
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This study also explored the role of motive 
patterns as possible mediators of the relation between 
life experiences and depression. Specifically, this 
study examined the relation between motives (intimacy 
and achievement), and life experiences (interpersonally-
oriented and achievement-oriented) on the one hand, and 
their association with depressive attributional style on 
the other. It was argued that depressed individuals who 
are high in intimacy motivation would show a more 
pronounced depressive attributional style for negative 
events in the interpersonal realm. Conversely, it was 
predicted that individuals who are high in achievement 
a more pronounced depressive motivation would show 
attributional style for negative events in the 
In retrospect, these predictions achievement realm. 
were extreme "longshots," and thus it is not terribly 
surprising that they received only a glimmer of support 
from the data. The one prediction supported was a 
significant, albeit statistically suspect, finding that 
for the stable ratings of negative real-life events, 
depressed individuals who were high in achievement 
motivation demonstrated more of a depressive 
attributional style for achievement-oriented, as opposed 
to interpersonally-oriented events. 
This study also examined the relation between 
intimacy motivation and depression. It was predicted 
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that individuals who are high in intimacy motivation 
would be less depressed than individuals who are low in 
intimacy motivation. Although the results suggest that 
intimacy motivation and depression are unrelated 
constructs, it is possible that a relation exists 
between these constructs but that it was obscured by the 
methodology employed in the present study. For example, 
perhaps differences in intimacy motivation between 
depressed and nondepressed subjects might have surfaced 
if depression had been assessed via clinical interviews, 
instead of questionnaires. 
In view of the fact that all of the subjects in 
the present study were asked to make various cognitive 
appraisals using questionnaires that assessed both 
imagined and personally relevant experiences, it is 
possible to make some comparisons regarding the relative 
utility of these two types of instruments. Much of the 
existing literature has taken a fairly pessimistic 
stance regarding the issue of whether a depressive 
cognitive style, particularly a depressive attributional 
style, can be identified using measures of real-life, as 
opposed to hypothetical experiences (e.g., Coyne & 
Gotlib, 1983; Hammen & Cochran, 1981; Peterson, 
Villanova & Raps, 1985). The current findings provide 
evidence that one particular measure of the cognitive 
appraisals of real-life experiences- the PEAQ- compares 
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favorably to a measure of hypothetical events- the ASQ-
in discriminating between depressed and nondepressed 
college students. 
The first type of evidence was that the 
internality and globality scales of the ASQ and the PEAQ 
were significantly, albeit weakly, correlated with one 
another. This suggests that to a certain degree they 
reflected the same underlying constructs, although they 
clearly reflected something different as well. Perhaps 
this difference is related to the fact that the task of 
the subject is quite different for each measure. In 
completing the PEAQ, subjects have a vast repertoire of 
personal information which they can draw upon in forming 
their cognitive appraisals. In completing the ASQ, on 
the other hand, the task of the subjects does not 
require a direct appraisal of their own experiences. 
Instead, it requires an appraisal of imaginary events. 
These imagined events are believed to serve as a medium 
through which the subjects can project their habitual 
modes of perceiving their own experiences. Second, a 
discriminant linear function analysis revealed that the 
two measures discriminated between depressed and 
nondepressed individuals equally well. Third, as 
mentioned earlier, differences between depressed and 
nondepressed individuals with regard to attributions for 
positive events were detected only on the PEAQ. This 
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latter finding suggests that measures of personally 
meaningful real-life experiences may actually be better 
than measures of hypothetical events in identifying a 
depressive cognitive style for positive events. 
Demonstrating that depressive cognitions can be 
discerned from ratings of personally meaningful 
experiences is theoretically important to both the 
reformulated learned helplessness model and to Hammen 
and her colleagues' expanded model. Weiner (1985) has 
argued convincingly that people make attributional 
statements, without any prompting, rather frequently, 
and in a wide range of situations. Given that people 
are natural attribution-makers, theories which suggest 
that depressives manifest a particular manner of making 
attributions should be able to demonstrate this 
phenomenon in the attributions that people make in 
response to their own positive and negative life 
experiences. 
Moreover, in general, finding evidence for a 
particular psychological process in the real-life 
accounts of a particular group of individuals is more 
compelling than finding evidence for the same process 
based on hypothetical scenarios or laboratory 
manipulations. While it can be argued that hypothetical 
scenarios and laboratory manipulations allow for more 
rigorous experimental controls, such as standardization 
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of the relevant stimuli, such procedures run the risk of 
misrepresenting the ways in which people construe their 
own personal experiences. Therefore, finding evidence 
that people exhibit a depressive cognitive style in 
reference to their own personal experiences is an 
especially important kind of evidence because it argues 
against the interpretation that the phenomenon of a 
depressive cognitive style is purely an experimental 
artifact. 
Peterson and Seligman (1984) have argued, 
however, that measures of hypothetical events, such as 
the ASQ, may be especially well-suited to the task of 
uncovering a depressive attributional style. In a 
hypothetical event, having not yet occurred, the 
individual must imagine rather then recall the 
situational events and personal states in which the 
event may be embedded. As a result, the cogni tve 
appraisals based on these events will be relatively 
unhampered by the realities of the situation since there 
are, in a sense, no realities to a hypothetical 
situation. Consequently, depressogenic mental sets may 
become particularly apparent in hypothetical situations. 
All of the aforementioned empirical findings and 
interpretive musings should be considered in light of 
some of the limitations of the present study. One such 
limitation is that although it assessed cognitions in 
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response to real-life experiences, this was accomplished 
by having subjects rate each of their experiences on a 
series of 7-point scales. Consequently, the methodology 
employed produced data which were rather removed from 
the actual experiences of the participants of the study. 
Additional research is needed which will identify 
cognitive patterns in depressed and nondepressed 
subjects' actual verbalizations through the use of 
content analysis, in order to arrive at a more 
"experience-near" sample of their thought patterns. 
There are a few noteworthy examples in the literature 
(e.g., Gong-Guy & Hammen, 1980; Harvey, 1981; Peterson, 
Luborsky & Seligman, 1983) which attest to the 
usefulness of this approach to the study of depression. 
Another limitation of the present study is that 
the subjects of the study were college students. The 
depressed college students in the present sample 
possessed a number of characteristics which might 
diminish the extent to which conclusions based on these 
individuals could be generalized to other groups of 
depressives. First, they were all between the ages of 
17 and 22, and were predominantly white, middle class, 
and (obviously) pighly educated. Second, they were all 
mildly to moderately, as opposed to severely, depressed. 
Third, it is not known what . proportion of these 





help for their depression. Additional research is 
needed that would replicate the approach of the present 
investigation with a clinically depressed sample to 
determine the extent to which these findings are 
applicable to other groups of depressives. 
A related limitation of the study was that 
depression was 
questionnaires. 








informative if future 
present findings in 
samples of individuals who were classified as depressed 
or nondepressed on the basis of more extensive clinical 
interviews. 
Perhaps the most serious drawback of the study 
was that it was correlational, rather than longitudinal 
in design. 
depressed 
Cognitive theories of depression argue that 
individuals characteristically manifest 
particular thought patterns which predispose them to 
develop symptoms of depression in the face of negative 
life experiences. 
to test these 
Consequently, the most convincing way 
theories is to conduct longitudinal 
investigations that follow up individuals with various 
cognitive styles over time in order to determine whether 
certain cognitive styles do, in fact, render people 
vulnerable to depression in response to negative life 
events. 
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These constraints notwithstanding, the present 
study provided evidence that has important implications 
for both the reformulated learned helplessness model, as 
well as Hammen and her colleagues' expanded model of 
depression. Support was garnered for the proposition 
that attributional (a la the reformulated learned 
helplessness model) and nonattributional (a la Hammen, 
et al. 's model) cognitive factors are associated with 
depression. Moreover, this support was garnered for the 
appraisals of both real-life and hypothetical positive 
and negative events. In light of these findings, it 
appears that the relation between cognitions, life 
events, and depression is likely to involve a complex 
interweaving of causal attributions and cognitions about 
consequences for both the positive and negative realms 
of life experience. Clearly, considerable additional 
research is needed to determine the parameters of such a 
model, particularly with regard to the presumed causal 
role of these cognitive dimensions. 
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Successes and Failures in Life 
This is a survey about some of the major successes and fa.ilures that you 
see as standing out in your life. We would like you to take some time and think 
about your own life now, focusing in on certain particular events in your past 
that you now see as either major successes or major failures. Below we would like 
you to describe some of these specific events in some detail. 
Before you do that, however, it is necessary that we define more clearly 
what we are looking for. First and foremost, it is essential that you describe 
for us specific events happening in a particular time and place. An event must 
occur within a relat1vely short time period (such as a moment, an hour, or a 
day) and in a particular praze-(such as your backyard, your dormitory room, Lincoln 
Park, etc.) Thus, an event is a specific "scene," "incident," or "happening" from 
your past rather than a more general theme or trend. For example, your first day 
in kindergarten would be an event, but your first year in kindergarten would not 
be an event because it takes place over too long a period of time. A particuTar 
conversation you had with your math teacher yesterday would be an event, but a 
special relationship you had with your tenth-grade music teacher would not be an 
event because it does not refer to a particular happening or incident. -----
We would like you to think about two particular kinds of events in your life 
specific successes and specific failures. A successful event or incident would be 
one in which the outcome proved satisfactory to you. A failur~ event or incident 
would be one in which the outcome of the event was unsatisfactory to you. 
Events can also be divided into those that concern doing things or accomplish-
ing things (task-oriented) events and those that concern being with people or 
engaging in personal relationships (people-oriented). Task-oriented events would 
include those specific incidents in which you are trying to accomplish some task, 
striving to attain a goal, or working to produce some kind of result. Though 
these kind of events may concern people, their primary purpose is the accomplishment 
of something rather than the cultivation of close interpersonal relationships. Task-
oriented events typically involve activities associated with work, school, career, 
sports, pastimes that involve striving to accomplish something, etc. Winning first 
prize in the fifth-grade science fair would be a task-oriented event as would be 
playing baseball with friends last weekend, taking an examination in psychology 
class last Tuesday, or sketching a picture of Lake Michigan yesterday morning. 
People-oriented events, on the other hand, are specifically concerned with inter-
personal relationships. These might include meeting the person whom you ultimately 
married on a spring day in 1979, having a conversation with a close friend last 
Thursday, arguing with your roommate about what show to watch on TV last Wednesday 
evening, your first date, the day your romance broke up, or a party with a 
number of friends and acquaintances that you attended in July of 1983. People-
oriented events typically involve activities associated with love, friendship, 
meeting peorle, and interacting with peorle. 
In your life, we are sure that there are many task-oriented and people-
oriented events which stand out in your memory. Below we would like you to describe 
in detail three events or incidents, for each of the following four types: 
1. Successful task-oriented event 
2. Failure task-oriented event 
3. Successful people-oriented event 
4. Failure people-oriented event 
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Thus, we are asking that you describe twelve (12) specific events 
from your past: 3 successful task-oriented, 3 failure task-oriented, 3 
successful people-oriented, and 3 failure people-oriented. Please take 
some time and think about vivid and memorable events from your past that fit 
into these categories. Then, for each of the 12 events that you can recall 
please describe in detail (at least a paragraph) exactly what happened 
in the event, what you were thinking about and feeling at the time that the 
event occurred, and why the event was a success or failure as you see it 
now. With respect to this last point, please try to analyze the reasons 
or causes of the event. In other words, why was a particular success a 
success and why did another particular failure turn out so badly. We 
would like you to be specific in your answers. Remember the event must be 
a particular inciden~ at a particular time and place that occurred in 
your life. For each event, tell us exactly what happened, what you were 
thinking and feeling, and what the reasons or causes of the event might have 
been. 
After you have written your description of each event, we would like you 
to answer all of the questions on the bottom and on the back of each page. 
Essentially we are asking you the same set of questions for each of the 12 
events you describe. This part of the study is easy to do and merely 
involves circling numbers to indicate the appropriate response. 
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Successful Task-oriented Event #1. (Describe what happened, what you were thinking 
and feeling, and what the reasons were for the success in this event). 
Answer each of the questions below as they pertain to this event and only this event. 
1. How happy was the event for you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
very 110de rate 1 y very 
unhappy happy happy 
2. How much had you expected this event to occur? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
completely somewhat complete 
unexpected expected uncertainty 
3. How likely do you feel it is that a similar event will occur in your life in 
the next three years? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
very unlikely saaewhat likely 
4. How much uncertainty have you experienced in your 1 ife as a result 
1 2 3 4 5 
no moderate 
uncertainty uncertainty 
5. How much control over the occurrence of this event did you have? 
priate response) 
6 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
no control 1110derate 
over event control 
7 
very likely 








6. Did this event occur because of something that changes readily (such as mood, 
effect, luck or fate) -or because of something relatively unchanging (ability, 
unchanging qualities of a situation or person). 
1 2 3 4 
changes changes 
easily sanewhat 
5 6 7 
unchanging 




of my life 
do the causes of this event affect other areas 
3 4 5 
affects some 
other aspects of 
my 1i fe 
• 
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of my 1 ife 
8. Dfd thfs event occur primarily because of something about you (your personality, 
effects, etc.) or was it primarily due to something about me situation or another 
~ers on. 2 3 4 5 6 7 
completely about half Completely 
because of me because of me and because of 
half because of situation or 
situation or another another person 
person 
9. ANSWER ONE OF THESE QUESTIONS 
a. If this event occurred primarily because of something about you, to what 
extent did you intend for this event to happen? 
b. Or, if this event occurred primarily because of something about the situation 
or person, to what extend did the other person or persons intentionally cause 








Successful Task-Oriented Event #2. 
Answer each of the questions below as they pertain to this event and only this event. 
1. How happy was the event for you? 
1 2 3 4 
very moderately 
unhappy . happy 
















3. How likely do you feel 
the next three years? 
it 1s that a similar event will occur in your life in 
4. 
1 2 3 
very unlikely 
4 
somewhat 1 ike 1 y 
5 6 
How much uncertainty have you experienced in your life as a result 





5. How much control over the occurrence of this event did you have? 
priate response) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
no control moderate 
over event control 
7 
very 1 ikely 







con tro 1 
6. Did this event occur because of sanething that changes readily (such as rood, 
effect, luck or fate) -or because of something relatively unchanging (ability, 
unchanging qualities of a situation or person). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
changes changes unchanging 
easily somewhat 
1. To what extent do the causes 
1 2 3 
affects no 
other aspects 
of my 1 ife 
of this event affect other areas 
4 5 
affects some 
other aspects of 
my life 
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of my life 
B. Did this event occur primarily because of something about you (your personality, 
effects. etc.) or was it primarily due to something about me situation or another 
~erson. 2 3 4 5 6 1 
completely about half Completely 
because of me because of me and because of 
half because of situation or 
situation or another another person 
person 
9. ANSWER ONE OF THESE QUESTIONS 
a. If this event occurred primarily because of something about you, to what 
extent did you intend for this event to happen? 
b. Or, 1f this event occurred primarily because of something about the situation 
or person, to what extend did the other person or persons intentionally cause 








Successful Task-oriented Event #3. 
lflswer each of the questions below as they pertain to this event and only this event. 
1. How happy was the event for you? 
1 z 3 4 5 6 7 
very mderately very 
unhappy happy happy 
2. How much had you expected this event to occur? 
1 z 3 4 5 6 7 
completely StmeWhat canplete 
unexpected expected uncertainty 
3. How likely do you feel 
the next three years? 
it is that a similar event will occur in your life in 
4. 





How much uncertainty have you experienced in your life as 






very 1 ikely 








1 z 3 4 5 6 
no control .aderate 




Did this event occur because of something that changes reddily (such as mood, 
effect, luck or fate) -or because of something relatively unchanging (ability, 
unchanging qualities of a situation or person). 
1 z 3 4 
changes daanges 
easily sa.ewhat 
5 6 7 
unchangint; 




of my life 
do the causes of this event affect other areas 
3 4 5 
affects some 
other aspects of 
my 1 ife 
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of my 1 ife 
8. Dfd this event occur primarily because of something ab.out lhu (your personality, 
effects, etc.) or was it primarily due to something about e situation or another 
~erson. 2 3 4 5 6 1 
completely about half Completely 
because of me because of me and because of 
half because of situation or 
situation or another another person 
person 
9. ANSWER ONE OF THESE QUESTIONS 
a. If this event occurred primarily because of something about you, to what 
extent did you intend for this event to happen? 
b. Or, if this event occurred primarily because of something about the situation 
or person, to what extend did the other person or persons intentionally cause 
the event to happen to you? 
1 
completely 
un intention a 1 
2 3 4 5 6 1 
completely 
intent ion a 1 
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Failure Task-oriented Event #1. (Describe what happened, what you were thinking 
and feeling, and wha~ the reasons were for the failure in this event.) 
Answer each of the questions below as they pertain to this event and only this event. 
1. How upsetting was this event 
1 2 3 






2. How RICh had you expected this event to occur? 










3. How likely do you feel 
the next three years? 
it is that a similar event will occur in your life in 
1 2 
very un 1 i ke 1 y 
3 4 
sanewhat likely 
5 6 7 
very likely 
4. How DIJCh uncertainty have you experienced in your life as a result 
1 2 3 4 5 6 





How much control 
pri ate response) 















Did this event occur because of something that changes readily (such as mood, 
effect, luck or fate) - or because of something relatively unchanging (ability, 
unchanging qualities of a situation or person). 
1 2 3 4 
changes changes 
easily sanewhat 
5 6 7 
unchan.9 i ng 




of my life 
do the causes of this event affect other areas 
3 4 5 
affects some 
other aspects of 
my 1 ife 
• ·. 
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of my 1 i fe 
8. D1d this event occur primarily because of something about you (your personality, 
effects, etc.) or was it primarily due to something about me situation or another 
~ers on. 2 3 4 5 6 7 
completely about half Completely 
because of me because of me and because of 
half because of situation or 
situation or another another person 
person 
9. ANSWER ONE OF THESE QUESTIONS 
a. If this event occurred primarily because of something about you, to what 
extent did you intend for this event to happen? 
b. Or, if this event occurred primarily because of something about the situation 
or person, to what extend did the other person or persons intentionally cause 








Failure Task-oriented Event #2. 
Answer each of the questions below as they pertain to this event and only this event. 
1. How upsetting was this event 
1 2 3 






2. How much had you expected this event to occur? 










3. How likely do you feel 
the next three years? 




1 2 3 
very un 1 i ke 1 y 
4 
sanewhat 1 ike 1 y 
5 6 
How much uncertainty have you experienced in your life as a result 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
no 
uncertainty 





















con tro 1 
Did this event occur because of something that changes readily (such as mood, 
effect, luck or fate) - or because of something relatively unchanging (ability, 
unchanging qualities of a situation or person). 
1 2 3 4 
changes changes 
easily somewhat 
5 6 7 
unchanging 
7. To what extent do the causes 
1 2 3 
affects no 
other aspects 
of my 1 He 
of this event affect other areas 
4 5 
affects some 
other aspects of 
my 1 He 
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of my life 
8. Ofd thfs event occur primarily because of something about~ (your personality, 
effects, etc.) or was it primarily due to something about toe situation or another 
~erson. 2 3 4 5 6 7 
completely about half Completely 
because of me because of me and because of 
half because of situation or 
situation or another another person 
person 
9. ANSWER ONE OF TI1ESE QUESTIONS 
a. If this event occurred primarily because of something about you, to what 
extent did you intend for this event to happen? 
b. Or, 1f this event occurred primarily because of something about the situation 
or person, to what extend did the other person or persons intentionally cause 




2 3 4 5 6 7 
completely 
intent i ana 1 
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Failure Task-oriented Event #3. 
Ans~r each of the questions below as they pertain to this event and only this event. 
1. How upsetting was this event for you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 not at all .aderately very upset 
upsetting upsetting 
2. How much had you expected this event to occur? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
completely sanewhat complete 
unexpected expected uncertainty 
3. How likely do you feel 
. the next three years? 
it is that a similar event will occur in your life in 
1 2 3 
very unlikely 
4 
SCJDelltlat 1 ike 1 y 
5 6 
4. How much uncertainty have you experienced in your life as a result 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
no 110derate 
uncertainty uncertainty 
5. How much control over the occurrence of this event did you have? 
priate response) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
no control 1110derate 
over event control 
7 
very likely 








6. Did this event occur because of something that changes readily (such as mood, 
effect, luck or fate) - or because of something relatively unchanging (ability, 
unchanging qualities of a situation or person). 
1 2 3 4 
changes changes 
eas lly saoewhat 
5 6 7 
unchanging 




of my life 
do the causes of this event affect 
3 4 
affects some 
other aspects of 
my 1 ife 
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other areas of your 1 i fe? 
5 6 7 
affects all 
other aspects 
of my 1 ife 
8. Ofd thfs event occur primarily because of something about~ (your personality, 
effects, etc.) or was it primarily due to something about toe situation or another 
verson. 2 3 4 5 6 7 
completely about half Canpletely 
because of me because of me and because of 
half because of situation or 
situation or another another person 
person 
9. ANSWER ONE OF THESE QUEST IONS 
a. If this event occurred primarily because of something about you, to what 
extent did you intend for this event to happen? 
b. Or, ff this event occurred primarily because of something about the situation 
or person, to what extend did the other person or persons intentionally cause 








Successful People-oriented Event #1 
'ns.er each of the CJjestions below as they pertain to this event and only this event. 
1. How ltappy was the event for you? 






2. How mch had you expected this event to occur? 











3. How likely do you feel 
the next three years? 
it is that a similar event will occur in your 1 ife in 
. 1 2 
very unlikely 
3 4 
sanewhat 1 ikely 
5 6 7 
very 1 ikely 
4. How much uncertainty have you experienced in your life as a result of this event? 
5. 
6. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
M ~~~~ 
uncertainty uncertainty 
How nruch cootrol 
priate response) 















Did this event occur because of something that changes readily (such as mood, 
effect, luck or fate) -or because of something relatively unchanging (ability, 
unchanging qualities of a situation or person). 
1 2 3 4 
changes changes 
easily somewhat 
5 6 7 
unchanging 




of my 1 ife 
do the causes of 
3 
this event affect other areas 
4 5 
affects some 
other aspects of 
my 1 i fe 
• 
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of my 1 ife 
8. Ofd thfs event occur primarily because of something ab.out you (.x,our personality, 




because of me 
3 
9. ANSWER ONE OF THESE QUESTIONS 
4 5 
about half 
because of me and 
half because of 







a. If this event occurred primarily because of something about you, to what 
extent did you intend for this event to happen? 
b. Or, if this event occurred primarily because of something about the situation 
or person, to what extend did the other person or persons intentionally cause 








Successful People-oriented Event #2 
Answer each of the questions below as they pertain to this event and only this event. 
1. How happy was the event for you? 






2. How much had you expected this event to occur? 











3. How likely do you feel 
the next 'three years? 





5 6 7 
very 1 ikely 
4. How much uncertainty have you experienced in your life as a result 
1 2 3 4 5 6 





How much control 
priate response) 















Did this event occur because of something that changes readily (such as mood, 
effect. luck or fate} - or because of something relatively unchanging (ability, 
unchanging qualities of a situation or person). 
1 2 3 4 
changes changes 
easOy sanewhat 
5 6 7 
unchanging 




of my 11fe 
do the causes of this event affect other areas 
3 4 5 
affects some 
other aspects of 
my 1 ife 
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of my 1 ife 
a. of d th1 s 
effects. 
~erson. 
event occur primarily because of something ab,aut you (your persona 1 ity, 
etc.) or was it primarily due to something about me situation or another 
completely 
because of me 
2 3 
9. ANSWER ONE OF THESE QUESTIONS 
4 5 
about half 
because of me and 
half because of 







a. If this event occurred primarily because of something about you, to what 
extent did you intend for this event to happen? 
b. Or, 1f this event occurred primarily because of something about the situation 
or person, to what extend did the other person or persons intentionally cause 








Successful People-oriented Event #3. 
Answer each of the questions below as they pertain to this event and only this event. 
1. How happy was the event for you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
very aoderately very 
unhappy happy happy 
2. How much had you expected this event to occur? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
completely somewhat complete 
unexpected expected uncertainty 
3. How likely do you feel 
the next three years? 
it is that a similar event will occur in your life in 
1 2 
very un1 ikely 
3 4 
saEwha t 1 ike 1 y 
5 6 7 
very 1 ikely 
4. How much uncertainty have you experienced in your life as a result of this event? 
5. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
no moderate 
uncertainty uncertainty 
How much control 
priate response} 















6. Did this event occur becausa of something that changes readily (such as mood, 
effect, luck or fate) -or oecause of something relatively unchanging (ability, 
unchanging qualities of a situation or person). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
changes changes unchanging 
easily ~ewhat 




of my 1 ife 
do the causes of 
3 
this event affect other areas 
4 5 
affects some 








of my 1 He 
8. Did this 
effects. 
~erson. · 
event occur primarily because of something ab.out you {your persona 1 i ty, 
etc.) or was it primarily due to something about me situation or another 
completely 
because of me 
2 3 
9. ANSWER ONE OF THESE QUESTIONS 
4 5 
about half 
because of me and 
half because of 







a. If this event occurred primarily because of something about you, to what 
extent did you intend for this event to happen? 
b. Or. if this event occurred primarily because of something about the situation 
or person, to what extend did the other person or pe~sons intentionally cause 








Failure People-oriented Event #1. (Describe what happened, what you were thinking 
and feeling, and what the reasons were for the failure in this event.) 
Answer each of the questions below as they pertain to this event and only this event. 
1. How upsetting was this event for you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at an moderately very upset upsetting upsetting 
2. How 111t1ch had you expected this event to occur? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 completely somewhat complete 
unexpected expected uncertainty 
3. How likely do you feel 
. the next three years? 









How much uncertainty have you experienced in your life as a result 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
no 
uncertainty 













very 1 ikely 








Did this event occur because of something that changes readily (such as mood, 
effect, luck or fate) -or because of something relatively unchanging (ability, 
unchanging qualities of a situation or person). 
1 2 3 4 
changes changes 
easily somewhat 
5 6 7 
unchanging 
7. To what extent do the causes 




of this event affect 
4 
affects some 
other aspects of 
my 1 ife 
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other areas of your life? 
5 6 7 
affects a11 
other aspects 
of my 1 ife 
8. Did this event occur primarily because of something ab.out you (your personality, 




because of me 
3 
9. ANSWER ONE OF TilESE QUESTIONS 
4 5 
about half 
because of me and 
half because of 







a. If this event occurred primarily because of something about you, to what 
extent did you intend for this event to happen? 
b. Or, 1f this event occurred primarily because of something about the situation 
or person, to what extend did the other person or persons intentionally cause 








Failure People-oriented Event ~2. 
Answer each of the questions below as they pertain to this event and only this event. 
1. How upsetting was this event for you? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all moderately very upset 
upsetting upsetting 
2. How much had you expected this event to occur? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
completely somewhat complete 
unexpected expected uncertainty 
3. How likely do you feel 
. the next three years? 









How much uncertainty have you experienced in your life as a result 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
no 
uncertainty 






















Did this event occur because of something that changes readily (such as mood, 
effect. luck or fate) -or because of something relati_vely unchanging (ability, 
unchanging qualities of a situation or person). 
1 2 3 4 
changes changes 
easily sanewhat 
5 6 7 
unc:l1anging 




of my 1 ife 
do the causes of this event affect other areas 
3 4 5 
affects some 
other aspects of 
my 1 ife 
• 
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of my 1 ife 
8. Dfd this event occur primarily because of something abput you (your personality, 
effects. etc.) or was it primarily due to something about me situation or another 
~erson. 
completely 
because of me 
2 3 
9. ANSWER ONE OF THESE QUESTIONS 
. 4 5 
about half 
because of me and 
half because of 







a. If this event occurred primarily because of something about you, to what 
extent did you intend for this event to happen? 
b. Or, 1f this event occurred primarily because of something about the situ at ion 
or person, to what extend did the other person or persons intentionally cause 








Failure People-oriente~ Event #3. 
Answer each of the questions below as they pertain to this event and only this event. 
1. How upsetting was this event for ~u? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all 110de rate 1 y very upset 
upsetting upsetting 
2. How much had you expected this event to occur? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
completely somewhat complete 
unexpected expected uncertaint~ 
3. How likely do you feel it is that a similar event will occur in your life in 
. the next three years? 
1 .2 3 4 5 6 
very unlikely sanewhat 1 ike ly 
4. How much uncertainty have you experienced in your life as a result 
1 2 3 4 5 
no moderate 
uncertainty uncertainty 
5. How much control over the occurrence of this event did you have? 
priate response) 
6 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
no control moderate 
over event control 
7 
very 1 ike 1 ~ 








6. Did this event occur because of sanething that changes readily (such as roood, 
effect, luck or fate) -or because of something relatively unchanging (ability, 
unchanging qualities of a situation or person). 










of my 1 ife 
do the causes of this event affect other 
3 4 5 
affects some 
other aspects of 
my 1 ife 
• 
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of my 1 i fe 
8. Dfd this event occur primarily because of something ab.out you (your personality, 




because of me 
3 
9. ANSWER ONE OF THESE QUESTIONS 
4 5 
about half 
because of me and 
ha 1f because of 







a. If this event occurred primarily because of something about you, to what 
extent did you intend for this event to happen? 
b. Or. if this event occurred primarily because of something about the situation 
or person, to what extend did the other person or persons intentionally cause 









CHECK LIST (B) 
DIRECTIONS: Below you will find words which describe 
different kinds of moods and.feelings. Check the words 
which describe How You Feel Now -- Today. Some of the 
words may sound alike, but we want you to check all the 
words that describe your feelings. Work rapidly and 
check all of the words which describe how you feel 
today. 
1 • Downhearted 17. Clean 
2. Lively 18. Dispirited 
3. Unfeeling 19. Moody 
4. Alone 20. Pleased 
5. Unhappy 21. Dead 
6. Alive 22. Sorrowful 
7. Terrible 23. Bleak 
8. Poor 24. Light 
9. Forlorn 25. Morbid 
10. Alert 26. Heavy-
hearted 
11. Exhausted 27. Easy-going 
12. Heartsick 28. Gray 
13. Bright 29. Melancholy 
14. Glum 30. Hopeful 
15. Desolate 31. Mashed 





This is a questionnaire. On the questionnaire are 
groups of statements. Please read the entire group of 
statements in each category. Then pick out the one 
statement in that group which best describes the way you 
feel today, that is, right now! Circle the letter on 
the answer sheet that corresponds to the statement you 
have chosen. If several statements in the group seem to 
apply equally well, circle each one. 
1. a. I do not feel sad 
b. I feel said or blue 
c. I am blue or sad all the time and I can't snap 
out of it 
d. I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it 
2. a. I am not particularly pessimistic or discouraged 
about the future 
b. I feel discouraged about the future 
c. I feel I have nothing to look forward to 
d. I feel that the future is hopeless and that 
things cannot improve 
3. a. I do not feel like a failure 
b. I feel I have failed more than the average 
person 
c. As I look back on my life, all I can see is a 
lot of failure 
d. I feel I am a complete failure as a person 
(parent,husband, wife) 
4. a. I am not particularly dissatisfied 
b. ~ don't enjoy things the way I used to 
c. don't get satisfaction out of anything anymore 
d. - am dissatisfied with everything 
5. a. I don't feel particularly guilty 
b. I feel bad or unworthy a good part of the time 
c. I feel quite guilty 
d. I feel as though I am very bad or worthless 
6. a. I don't feel I am being punished 
b. I have a feeling that something bad may happen 
to me 
c. I feel I am being punished or will be punished 
d. I feel I deserve to be punished 
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7. a. I don't feel disappointed in myself 
b. I am disappointed in myself 
c. I am disgusted with myself 
d. I hate myself 
8. a. I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else 
b. I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or 
mistakes 
c. I blame myself for my faults 
d. I blame myself for everything bad that happenes 
9. a. I don't have any thoughts of harming myself 
b. I feel I would be better off dead 
c. I have definite plans about committing suicide 
d. I would kill myself if I had the chance 
10. a. I don't cry any more than usual 
b. I cry more than I used to 
c. I cry all the time now. I can't stop it 
d. I used to be able to cry but now I can't cry at 
all even though I want to 
11. a. I am no more irritated now than I ever am 
b. I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I 
used to 
c. I feel irritated all the time 
d. I don't get irritated at all at the things that 
used to irritate me 
12. a. I /have not lost interest in other people 
b. I am less interested in other people than I used 
to be 
c. I have lost most of my interest in other people 
and have little feeling for them 
d. I have lost all of my interest in other people 
and don't care about them at all 
13. a. I make decisions about as well as ever 
b. I try to put off making decisions 
c. I have great difficulty in making decisions 
d. I can't make any decisions at all anymore 
14. a. I don't feel I look any worse than I used to 
b. I am worried that I am looking old or 
unattractive 
c. I feel that there are permanent changes in my 
appearance and they make me look unattractive 
d. I feel that I am ugly or repulsive looking 
15. a. I can work about as well as before 
b. It takes extra effort to get started at doing 
something 
147 
c. I have to push myself very hard to do anything 
d. I can't do any work at all 
16. a. I can sleep as well as usual 
b. I wake up more tired in the morning than I used 
to 
c. I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find 
it hard to get back to sleep 
d. I wake up early every day and can't get more 
than 5 hours sleep 
17. a. I don't get any more tired than usual 
b. I get tired more easily than I used to 
c. I get tired from doing anything 
d. I get too tired to do anything 
18. a. My appetite is no worse than usual 
b. My appetite is not as good as it used to be 
c. My appetite is much worse now 
d. I have no appetite at all anymore 
19. a. I haven't lost much weight, if any, lately 
b. I have lost more than 5 pounds 
c. I have lost more than 10 pounds 
d. I have lost more than 15 pounds 
20. a. I am no more concerned about my health than 
usual 
b. I am concerned about aches and pains or upset 
stomach or constipation 
c. I am so concerned with how I feel or what I feel 
that it's hard to think of much else 
d. I am completely absorbed in what I feel 
21. a. I have not noticed any recent change in my 
interest in sex 
b. I am less interested in sex than I used to be 
c. I am much less interested in sex now 







Please try to vividly imagine yourself in the situations that follo~. 
If such a situation happened to you, ~hat ~ould you feel ....ould have 
caused it. While events may have many causes, ~e want you to pick only 
one--the major cause if this event happened to ~· Please write this 
cause in the blank provided after each event. Next we want you to 
answer some questions about the cause and a final question about the 
situation. To summarize, we want you to: 
1) Read each situation and vividly imagine it happening to you. 
2) Decide what you feel would be the major cause of this situation 
if it happened to you. 
3) Write one cause in the blank provided. 
4) Answer three questions about the cause. 
5) Answer one question about the situation. 
6) Go on to the next situation. 
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YOU MEET A FRIEND WHO COHPL D-IENTS YOU ON YOUR APPEARANCE. 
1) Write. down the~ major cause-----------------------------------
2) Is the cause of your friend's compliment due to something about you 
or something about the other person or circumstances? (Circle one 
number) 
Totally due to 
the other person 
or circumstances 
1 2 j 4 5 6 7 
Totally due 
to me 
3) In the future when you are with your friends, will this cause again 








4) Is the cause something that just affects interacting with friends or 








5) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? (CircJe 
one number) 
Not at all 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
important 
YOU HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR A JOB UNSUCCESSFULLY FOR SOME TIME. 
6) Write down~ major cause --------------------------------------
7) Is the cause of your unsuccessful job search due to something about 
you or something about other people or circumstances? (Circle one 
number) 
Totally due to 
other people or 
circumstances 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Totally due 
to me 
8) In the future when looking for a job, will this cause again influ-









9) Is the cause something that just influences looking for a job or 
does it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number) 
Influences just 
this particular 1 
situation 




10) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
important 
YOU INVEST MO~EY IN THE STOCK MARKET .~'ID MAKE -A PROFIT. 
11) Write down ~major cause -------------------------------------
12) Is the cause of your making a profit in the stock market due to 
something about you or something about other people or circum-
stances? (Circle one number) 
Totally due to 
other peo?le or 1 
circumstances 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Totally due 
to me 
13) In the future when investing in the stock market, will this cause 
again influence what happens? (Circle one number) 
Will never 
again influence 1 
what happens 




14) Is the cause something that just affects investing in stocks or does 
it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one number) 
Influences just 
this parti"cular l 
situation 




15) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle c.ne number) 
Not at all 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
important 
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A FRIEND ClJMES TO YOU WITH A PROBLEH AND YOU OON'T TRY TO HELP TH'El1. 
16) Write down the ~major cause -----------------------------------
17) Is the cause of your not helping your friend due to something ~bout 
you or something about other people or circumstances? (Circle one 
number) 
Totally due to 
other people or 
circumstances 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Totally due 
to me 
18) In the future when a friend comes to you with a problem, will this 








19) Is the cause something that just affects what happens when a friend 
comes to you with a problem or does it also influence other areas 








20) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
important 
YOU GIVE AN TI1PORTA1IT TALK IN FRONT OF A GROUP AND THE AUDIENCE REACT 
NEGATIVELY. 
21) Write down the ~major cause----------------------------------
22) Is the cause of the audience reacting negatively due to something 
about ycu or something about other pF>ople or circumstances? 
(Circle one.number) 
Totally due to 
other people or 
circumstances 




23) In the future when giving talks, will this cause again influence 
what happens? (Circle one number) 
Will never. Will always 
again influence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 influence what 
what happens happens 
24) Is this cause something that just influences giving talks or does 
it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one nUI!lber) 
Influences just Influences 
this particular 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 situations 
situation my life 
25) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
important 
YOU 00 AN IMPORTANT PROJEC! WITH A GROUP M"'D FIND THAT THE PROJEC! 
TURNS OUT WELL • 
26) Write down the ~major cause 
27) Is the cause of the group working well together due to something 
about you or something about the other people or circumstances? 
(Circle one number) 
Totally due to Totally due 
other people or 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to me 
circumstances 
28) In the future when working on a group project, will this cause 
again influence what happens? (Circle one number) 
Will never Will always 
all 
in 
again influence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 influence what 
what happens happens 
29) Is this cause something that just affects group projects or does it 









30) How important would this situation be if it happened to you~ 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
important Important 
YOU MEET A FRIDi'D WHO AC!S HOSTILELY TO YOU. 
31) Write down the ~major cause 
32) Is the cause of your friend acting hostile due to something about 
you or something about other people or circumstances? (Circle one 
number) 
Totally due to 
other people or 1 
circumstances 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Totally due 
to me 
33) In the future when interacting with fri~~ds, ~~11 this cause again 
influence what happens? (Circle one number) 
Will never 
again influence 1 
what happens 




34) Is the cause something that just influences interacting with friends 
or does it also influence other areas of your life? (Circle one 
number) 
In£1 uences just 
this particular 1 
situation 




35) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
E."<tremely 
important 
YOU CAN'T GET ALL THE WORK DONE TlLo\T JTHERS EXPEC'r OF YOU. 
36) Write down the ~ major cause --------------------------------
155 
37) Is the cause of your not getting the work done due to something 
about you or something about the other people or circumstances? 
(Circle one number) 
Totally due to 
other people or 
circumstances 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Totally due 
to me 
38) In the future when doing the work that others expect, will thi$ 








39) Is.the cause something that just affects doing work that others 
expect you to do or does it also influence other areas of your 








40) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
important 
YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE (BOYFRIEND/GIRLFRIEND) t-lERE HAVING PROBLENS 
·GETTING ALONG BUT YOU WERE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE DIFFICULTIES. 
41) Write down the ~ major cause ---------------------------------
42) Is the cause of the problems being resolved due to something abvut 
you or something about other people or circumstances? (Circle 
one number) 
Totally due to 
other people or 
circumstances 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Totally due 
to me 
43) In the future when trying to resolve problems, will this cause again 









44) Is this cause something that just affects getting along with your 
spouse (boyfriend/girlfriend) or does it also influence other areas 
of your life? (Circle one number) 
Influence just Influences all 
this particular 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 situations in 
situa~ion my life 
45) How i::lpor~a11t would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
important important 
YOU APPLY FOR A POSITION TtL~ YOU W~~ VERY BADLY (e.g., IMPORTANT JOB, 
GRADUATE SCHOOL ADHISSION, etc.) AND YOU GET IT. 
46) Write down ~ major cause 
47) Is the cause of your getting the position due to something about 
you or something about other people or circumstances? (Circle 
one number) 
Totally due to 




3 4 5 6 7 
Totally due 
to me 
48) In the future when applying for a position, will this cause again 








49) Is the cause something that just influences applying for a position 









50) How important would this situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
important 
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YOU GO OUT ON A DATE AND IT GOES BADLY. 
51) Write down the ~major cause ---------------------------------
52) Is the cause of the date going badly due to something about you or 
something about other people or circumstances? (Circle one number) 
Totally due to 
other people 
or circumstances 
1 2 . 3 4 5 6 7 
Totally due 
to me 
53) In the future when dating, will this cause again influence what 




1 2 3 4 5 6 
Will ahtays · 
7 influence what 
happens 
54) Is the cause something that just influences dating or does it also 




1 2 3 4 5 6 
Influences all 
7 situations in 
my life 
55) How important would this ·situation be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
important 
YOU AND THE MEMBERS OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD HAVE BEEN GETTING ALONG WELL. 
56) Write down the ~ major cause -----------------------------------
.57) Is the cause of your household getting along ·due to something about 
you or something about the other people or circumstances? (Circle 
one number) 
Totally due to 
other people or 
circumstances 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Totally due 
7 to me 
58)· In the future in your household, will this cause again influence 




1 2 3 4 5 6 
Will always 
7 influence what 
happens 
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59) Is the cause something that just affects how your household gets 









60) How import~r.t ~culd this situatio~ be if it happened to you? 
(Circle one number) 
Not at all 
illlportant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely 
important 
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